Skills/Glama/duzenbaz

duzenbaz@0.1.1

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "An MCP server that lets AI assistants preview and apply file organization, duplicate cleanup, and batch renames inside folders you explicitly allow, plus read screen-time statistics and optionally search clipboard history. Every file-changing action is undoable, nothing is deleted permanently, and read-only or path-restricted modes keep the assistant within safe bounds." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher bartuabihd · publishing for 3 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 3d ago
$npx skills add duzenbaz
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso ornek.com, a.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it under the guard. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Privileged sudo command.github/workflows/ci.yml:39 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo apt-get install -y xvfb gnome-keyring dbus-x11Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Privileged sudo command.github/workflows/ci.yml:35 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo apt-get updateFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Privileged sudo command.github/workflows/ci.yml:36 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo apt-get install -y libwebkit2gtk-4.1-dev build-essential libssl-dev libxdo-dev \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Privileged sudo command.github/workflows/ci.yml:156 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo apt-get install -y xdotool imagemagick openbox x11-utils gdbFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Privileged sudo command.github/workflows/ci.yml:134 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo apt-get install -y "./$DEB"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill command.github/workflows/ci.yml:178 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill "$APP" || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
LOW
Prompt injectionsrc/lib/i18n/tr.json:182 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file"updatesToast": "Yeni sürüm var: {version}. Ayarlar'dan kurabilirsiniz."Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionrelease/v0.1.1/RELEASE_NOTES-TR.md:6 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file…cellemeler).** Varsayılan olarak kapalıdır. Açarsanız uygulama açılırken GitHub'dan en son sürüm numarasını sorar ve onayınızla yeni sürümü indirip kurabilir. Her …Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionREADME-TR.md:228 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file… Güncellemeler**'i siz açmadıkça internete bağlanmaz; açarsanız yalnızca GitHub'dan en son sürüm numarasını sorar (veri gönderilmez) ve her güncellemeyi imzayla do…Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionsrc/lib/i18n/tr.json:170 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file"updatesHint": "Kapalıyken uygulama internete hiç bağlanmaz. Açıkken yalnızca GitHub'dan en son sürüm numarası sorulur; hiçbir veri gönderilmez.",Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectiondocs/KOD_IMZALAMA.md:55 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file- **Sürüm eşitliği:** `package.json` ve `tauri.conf.json` sürümleri aynı olmalı; iş akışı dosya adını `package.json`'dan alır.Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Process kill command.github/workflows/ci.yml:213 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesif kill -0 "$PID" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill command.github/workflows/ci.yml:215 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill "$PID"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈34 tok
1 file · 79 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

duzenbaz@0.1.1 safety verdict: Verified (install only) — KillerSkills