Skills/Glama/docker-mcp

docker-mcp@0.4.0

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Enables an AI agent to run and inspect containers, build and pull images, manage volumes and networks, drive Compose projects, clean up, and run self-checking practice labs. Startup modes restrict it to read-only, labs-only, or full Docker control with confirmation before dangerous operations." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher falkenslab · publishing for 6 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 42 min ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
4 of 4 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso docker.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it under the guard. Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: HTTP URL with a raw public IP address. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.3sprocess4 of 4 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.3sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
HTTP URL with a raw public IP addressscripts/check-labs.mjs:79 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot nameconst out = await inside("wget -q -T 5 -O /dev/null http://1.1.1.1 2>/dev/null && echo reached || echo blocked");Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Privileged sudo commandtest/requirements.test.ts:9 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesinstall: { windows: "winget install Nothing", macos: "brew install nothing", linux: "sudo apt install nothing", url: "https://example.org" },Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/helpers.ts:9 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesexport const testConfig = (env: Record<string, string> = {}): Config => loadConfig({ ...env, CLAUDE_PLUGIN_DATA: env.CLAUDE_PLUGIN_DATA ?? "/tmp/docker-mcp-test" });Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP addressscripts/check-labs.mjs:79 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringconst out = await inside("wget -q -T 5 -O /dev/null http://1.1.1.1 2>/dev/null && echo reached || echo blocked");Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known package.claude/skills/release/SKILL.md:51 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code…mcp version` shows it, the extension in agent-extensions (docker-lab) pins it: `npx -y @falkenslab/[email protected]` in its `.mcp.json`, and its `plugin.json` require…Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagescripts/build.mjs:2 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code// it with `npx -y <package>@<version>` and never `npm install`. `--watch` rebuilds on change.Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/tools/labs.ts:103 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files… title: "Check a lab", description: "Run the lab's check (its lab.json) in its running service: passed when it exits 0, with its output to explain what failed. For a teacher, whether a statement or a solution works;…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈7,794 tok
12 files · 80 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim falkenslab: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. HTTP URL with a raw public IP address≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  3. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  4. Privileged sudo command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  6. URL using a raw public IP address≈ +2 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
Publish a new version to Glama, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim falkenslabPropose a patch to the maintainer