dll-analyzer@r1
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "Enables MCP clients to statically analyze Windows DLLs and query an evidence-grounded local agent for plain-English explanations, with claims tied to cited tool calls, addresses, and bytes." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso cloudflare.com, ollama.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it under the guard. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is dll-analyzer@r1 safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 73/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command; Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
"mingw": "sudo apt install mingw-w64",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.proc = subprocess.run(["capa", "-j", path], capture_output=True, text=True, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# Run on the Linux VM (needs mingw-w64: sudo apt install -y mingw-w64).Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.proc = subprocess.run(["floss", "-j", path], capture_output=True, text=True, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.curl -fsSL https://ollama.com/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["explorer", "/select,", os.path.normpath(path)])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.curl -fsSL https://ollama.com/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.graphviz = backends.require("graphviz", "sudo apt install graphviz && pip install graphviz")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."graphviz": "graphviz (sudo apt install graphviz; pip install graphviz)",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.subprocess.run(["xdg-open", folder], check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.sudo apt install -y git build-essential graphviz python3-pip python3-venv mingw-w64Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "streamlit", "run", os.path.join(HERE, "app.py")])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["bash", os.path.join(HERE, "testdlls", "build.sh")])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run([sys.executable, os.path.join(HERE, "gui.py")])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "unittest", "discover", "-s", "tests", "-v"], cwd=HERE)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
7 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim sumit-2004: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.