Skills/Glama/disk-janitor-mcp

disk-janitor-mcp@0.1.0

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Enables coding agents to scan for reclaimable disk junk and write reviewable, digest-bound cleanup plans and apply them into a reversible quarantine. It deliberately exposes no approval or purge tools, so permanent deletion and sign-off stay with a human in a real terminal." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher kienpt91 · publishing for 3 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 3d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it under the guard. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 70/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; References a credential file in the home directory. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/domain/policy/protected.ts:44 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files[/^\.env(\..*)?$/, "environment file"],Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Unicode escape sequence detectedsrc/domain/shared/escape.ts:13 · Unicode escape sequence detected — may contain obfuscated payloads…usable to smuggle invisible text). They are always escaped. const HIDDEN = /^[\u00ad\u034f\u061c\u115f\u1160\u17b4\u17b5\u180b-\u180f\u200b-\u200f\u2028-\u202e\u2060-\u206f\u3164\ufe00-\ufe0f\ufeff\uffa0\uf…Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/domain/policy/protected.ts:126 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif (/^\.env(\..*)?$/.test(lower) && !ENV_TEMPLATE.test(lower)) return "contains an environment file";Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/test-in-container.sh:13 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsdocker run --rm -u 0 -v "$VOL:/nm" "$IMAGE" chown "$(id -u):$(id -g)" /nm >/dev/nullFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directoryscripts/demo.sh:119 · References a credential file in the home directorycat "$HOME/Documents/taxes.txt" "$HOME/.ssh/id_demo" "$DEMO/victim/keep.txt"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
CRITICAL
Reads credential paths from the home directoryscripts/demo.sh:119 · Reads credential paths from the home directorycat "$HOME/Documents/taxes.txt" "$HOME/.ssh/id_demo" "$DEMO/victim/keep.txt"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/secret-scan.sh:33 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files.env|.env.*|*.env) case "$1" in .env.example|.env.sample|.env.template|*.env.example) return 1 ;; esac; return 0 ;;Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directoryscripts/demo.sh:75 · References a credential file in the home directoryecho "-----fake key material-----" > "$HOME/.ssh/id_demo"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈37 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

10 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Reads credential paths from the home directory≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim kienpt91: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Unicode escape sequence detected≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
  6. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
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