Skills/Glama/discord-mcp

discord-mcp@r1

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Grants read-only access to your own Discord DMs, group chats, and server channels, letting a model search messages, pull recent or full conversation history, and view attachments like images and PDFs. Messages are kept in a local SQLite cache with full-text search, with older history fetched from Discord only on demand." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher ariobarin · publishing for 0 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 1 h ago
$npx skills add discord-mcp
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Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
2 of 2 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
AUTHAUTH_CLIENT_IDAUTH_CLIENT_SECRETDISCORD_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: ALLOWED_USERS, DATA_DIR, MCP_TRANSPORT, PUBLIC_URL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for AUTH, AUTH_CLIENT_ID, AUTH_CLIENT_SECRET, DISCORD_TOKEN and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is discord-mcp@r1 safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 90/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'discord'
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocess2 of 2 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:6 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions&& mkdir /data && chown app /dataFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathscompose.yaml:4 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_file: .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈35 tok
1 file · 10 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.