deja@0.4.0
VERIFIED· startup onlyPublisher claims: "Enables coding agents to remember past fixes, decisions, gotchas, and working commands across sessions and repositories, detect stale memories, and query data lineage across SQL, dbt, Spark, notebooks, and Airflow." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
DEJA_CONTEXT_TOKENSConfiguration, not credentials: CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR, DEJA_DB, DEJA_DISABLE, DEJA_HOME, DEJA_TIMING- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for DEJA_CONTEXT_TOKENS and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 20 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
'PostToolUse (Edit .sql)': input({ tool_name: 'Edit', tool_input: { file_path: join(repo, 'jobs', 'load.sql') } }),Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.- Something surprised you or cost time ("Integration tests need `docker compose up -d postgres`; the .env URL points at RDS"). Kind `gotcha`.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.// installed (npx -p @anthropic-ai/tokenizer node bench/tokens.mjs) and otherwiseFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.['gotcha', 'Prisma migrations must run before seeding', 'Seed script assumes the latest schema; run `npx prisma migrate deploy` first.', ['src/db.ts']],Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.assert.equal(commandFamily('npx tsc --noEmit'), 'tsc');Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.