Skills/Glama/dblink

dblink@2.1.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Enables agents to connect to and work with PostgreSQL, MySQL, Redis, SQLite, and MongoDB through a uniform tool surface for opening connections, running queries and commands, inspecting schemas, and managing documents." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher fb0sh · publishing for 3 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 3d ago
$npx skills add dblink
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
DBLINK_HTTP_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: DBLINK_BIND, DBLINK_IDLE_MS, DBLINK_MAX_POOLS, DBLINK_POOL_SIZE, DBLINK_PORT
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for DBLINK_HTTP_TOKEN and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 91/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

CRITICAL
Fake instruction boundary tagdocs/agents/domain.md:9 · Fake instruction boundary tag- **`docs/adr/`**: read ADRs that touch the area you're about to work in. In multi-context repos, also check `src/<context>/docs/adr/` for context-scoped decisions.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:20 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsRUN mkdir -p /data && chown node:node /dataFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈685 tok
2 files · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.