Is cvestate@1.0.0 safe to install?

cvestate@1.0.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Enables vulnerability lookup and triage across NVD, EPSS, CISA KEV, OSV, and many other sources, while tracking an estate's exposure changes from SBOMs and lockfiles through snapshots and prioritized diffs." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher enabled404 · publishing for 0 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 1 h ago

$npx skills add cvestate

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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.

Tested: the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested: server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for: GITHUB_TOKENGREYNOISE_API_KEYNVD_API_KEYVULNCHECK_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: ABUSEIPDB_KEY, AUDIT_LOG_PATH, CACHE_DB_PATH, CIRCL_PDNS_PASS, CIRCL_PDNS_USER, MAX_RETRIES, MCP_TRANSPORT, REQUEST_TIMEOUT, SHODAN_KEY, URLSCAN_KEY, VIRUSTOTAL_KEY, WATCHTOWER_DB_PATH
Where it talks to: no vendor host named in the codeAlso circl.lu, nist.gov, pwnedpasswords.com, shodan.io, microsoft.com, vulncheck.com, haveibeenpwned.com, osv.dev, first.org, cisa.gov, mitre.org, githubusercontent.com, abuseipdb.com, greynoise.io, abuse.ch, virustotal.com, urlscan.io, crt.sh, redhat.com, ubuntu.com, ransomwhe.re — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw: no credential files read · no network
What we could not test: server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names circl.lu, nist.gov, pwnedpasswords.com, shodan.io, microsoft.com, vulncheck.com, haveibeenpwned.com, osv.dev, first.org, cisa.gov, mitre.org, githubusercontent.com, abuseipdb.com, greynoise.io, abuse.ch, virustotal.com, urlscan.io, crt.sh, redhat.com, ubuntu.com, ransomwhe.re as well as its own vendor. The guard injects GITHUB_TOKEN, GREYNOISE_API_KEY, NVD_API_KEY, VULNCHECK_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 89/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations

t+CategoryObserved action

0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle

0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·

0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed

0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only

0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM

Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_config.py:25 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesload_dotenv is suppressed so the .env file on disk doesn't interfere.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.

AST05

MEDIUM

Access to sensitive file paths.github/PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md:28 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- [ ] Any new API keys are documented in `.env.example` with instructionsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.

AST05

MEDIUM

Access to sensitive file pathsDockerfile:14 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Run: docker run --rm -p 8000:8000 --env-file .env cvestateFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.

AST05

MEDIUM

Process kill commandsrc/cve_mcp/utils/ssvc.py:24 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesCan an attacker reliably automate steps 1-4 of the kill chainFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.

AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded

≈34 tok

1 file · 81 in bundle

Tool list per prompt

≈0 tok

0 tools · 0 per tool

Handshake

no reply

launch to tools/list, stdio

Undocumented tools

description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.