cullyard@0.2.0
VERIFIEDPublisher claims: "Enables an MCP client to scan a local folder, sort photos, video, music, documents, and PDFs into lanes, and create resized or trimmed copies while showing moves in a browser desk. It can also seal a SHA-256 digest of the sort log to Solana devnet for later verification." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Server started and answered tools/list.- Tested
- MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso solana.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it under the guard; read the third-party hosts first. The code names solana.com as well as its own vendor. The guard pins the network to the hosts the honeypot saw.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 35 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
assert.equal((await fetch(`${base}/api/upload?name=.env`, { method: 'POST', body: 'x' })).status, 400);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Unknown extensions are still listed as `other`. The desk never refuses a file because of its extension.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.| File kinds | 10 kinds; unknown extensions are listed as `other`, never refused |Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.const raw = (await fs.readFile(file, 'utf8')).replace(/^/, '').trim();Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.