Skills/Glama/crousandgo-mcp

crousandgo-mcp@0.1.0

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Enables an AI agent to list the 1 € Crous & Go student menus, ask which variant you want, and place and pay for the order through your own Izly account, with dry runs, a kill switch, a 1 € price cap, and explicit confirmation before any real purchase." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher daniilsys · publishing for 3 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 3d ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso crous-strasbourg.fr, croustillant.menu, izly.fr — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 73/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/python3.11
0.2sprocessexec /tmp/ks-detonate-YVmczV/setup/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/crousandgo-order/.venv/bin/python3.11
0.2sprocessexited 1: Python 3.10+ with venv and pip is required.
0.3sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.3sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.5sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.7sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.7sprocessexec /usr/bin/python3.11
0.7sprocessexec /tmp/ks-detonate-YVmczV/later/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/crousandgo-order/.venv/bin/python3.11
0.7sprocessexited 1: Python 3.10+ with venv and pip is required.

Static findings

CRITICAL
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentialssrc/crousandgo/izly.py:23 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineering"""Type the secret code on Izly's on-screen keypad (the input itself is read-only)."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsinstall.sh:29 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filescp "$HERE/.env.example" "$CONF/.env"; chmod 600 "$CONF/.env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsinstall.sh:28 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif [ ! -f "$CONF/.env" ]; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandinstall.sh:27 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsmkdir -p "$CONF"; chmod 700 "$CONF"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_tools.py:128 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesos.environ["CROUSGO_LANG"] = "en" # a developer's .env must not change the expected textFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/crousandgo/config.py:24 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfor f in (CONFIG_DIR / ".env", ROOT / ".env"):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/crousandgo/auth.py:28 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"~/.config/crousandgo/.env (see .env.example).")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/crousandgo/izly.py:56 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"~/.config/crousandgo/.env (see .env.example).")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/crousandgo/tools.py:6 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesdefault, kill switch, order budget, 1 EUR price cap, audit log).Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandinstall.sh:29 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionscp "$HERE/.env.example" "$CONF/.env"; chmod 600 "$CONF/.env"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/crousandgo/config.py:3 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesSecrets come from the environment, or from ~/.config/crousandgo/.env / ./.env (first one wins,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsinstall.sh:30 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesecho " fill in $CONF/.env (Crous & Go and Izly credentials)"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/crousandgo/config.py:9 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2] # project root (an editable install keeps the .env there)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/crousandgo/tools.py:9 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesCROUSGO_ENABLE_WRITES=1 real orders are refused unless set (kill switch)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/crousandgo/izly.py:130 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"~/.config/crousandgo/.env (see .env.example).")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈866 tok
1 file · 21 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

7 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim daniilsys: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  5. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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