Skills/Glama/cove-tts

cove-tts@r1

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Enables AI clients to turn text into synthesized speech through a remotely hosted GPT-SoVITS model, returning a signed, time-limited audio link that can be played or downloaded. Supports Chinese and English text with your own reference audio for voice and tone." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher sue1231511 · publishing for 3 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 20 min ago

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
MCP_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: _CUDA_VISIBLE_DEVICES, API_V2_PID, CUDA_VISIBLE_DEVICES, LOCAL_RANK, MASTER_ADDR, MASTER_PORT, PUBLIC_BASE_URL, REF_AUDIO_PATH, REF_AUDIO_URL, REF_PROMPT_LANG, REF_PROMPT_TEXT, USE_LIBUV
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso arxiv.org, huggingface.co, doi.org, python.org, shields.io, yuque.com, hf.space, fbaipublicfiles.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names arxiv.org, huggingface.co, doi.org, python.org, shields.io, yuque.com, hf.space, fbaipublicfiles.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects MCP_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is cove-tts@r1 safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 75/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive file system command detected; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Destructive file system command detecteddownload_models.sh:56 · Destructive file system command detectedrm /tmp/G2PWModel.zipFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsapp/GPT_SoVITS/BigVGAN/bigvgan.py:20 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfrom .env import AttrDictFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:24 · Destructive file system command detectedRUN sh /tmp/download_models.sh && rm /tmp/download_models.shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandstart.sh:40 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill "$API_PID" "$TAIL_PID" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:30 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsRUN chmod +x /app/start.shFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandstart.sh:14 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# 子进程退出后、被 wait 回收前会变成僵尸,kill -0 对僵尸仍然返回成功,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:8 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedapp/api_v2.py:239 · Python subprocess execution detectedprocess = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandstart.sh:54 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill "$MCP_PID" "$API_PID" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandstart.sh:35 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill "$TAIL_PID" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandstart.sh:57 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill "$TAIL_PID" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
LOW
Prompt injectionapp/tools/i18n/locale/tr_TR.json:3 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file…,但是对高频重的板式混响去不干净。": "(234)DeEcho:Gecikme etkilerini giderir. Aggressive, Normal'dan daha kapsamlı bir şekilde giderir, DeReverb ek olarak yankıyı giderir, tek kana…Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈36 tok
1 file · 80 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

5 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim sue1231511: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  5. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
Publish a new version to Glama, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim sue1231511Propose a patch to the maintainer