Skills/Glama/counted

counted@0.1.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Enables users to interview grieving families, cross-check disaster and weather records, identify indirect disaster-related deaths using CDC guidance, and draft certifier statements for medical examiners." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher usv240 · publishing for 5 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 5d ago
$npx skills add counted
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
COUNTED_ADMIN_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: AWS_REGION, COUNTED_ADJUDICATOR_MODEL, COUNTED_AFTERMATH_DAYS, COUNTED_DAILY_RUNS, COUNTED_DAILY_SPEECH, COUNTED_EXAMINER_MODEL, COUNTED_FALLBACK_MODEL, COUNTED_INTERVIEW_MODEL, COUNTED_KEYS_FILE, COUNTED_KEYS_TABLE, COUNTED_MEMORY_ID, COUNTED_PUBLIC_URL, COUNTED_SECOND_EXAMINER_FALLBACK, COUNTED_SECOND_EXAMINER_MODEL, COUNTED_STEERING
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso fema.gov, on.aws, cdc.gov, nih.gov, census.gov, iastate.edu — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names fema.gov, on.aws, cdc.gov, nih.gov, census.gov, iastate.edu as well as its own vendor. The guard injects COUNTED_ADMIN_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 88/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detecteddeploy/agentcore_package.py:53 · Python subprocess execution detectedbuild = subprocess.run(["git", "rev-parse", "--short", "HEAD"], capture_output=True, text=True, cwd=ROOT).stdout.strip()Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:13 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsRUN uv sync --frozen --no-dev && useradd -r -u 1001 counted && chown -R counted /appFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
LOW
Role reassignment attemptdocs/EVALUATION.md:57 · Role reassignment attempt · informational: not an instruction file…n) with a scripted model that misbehaves on purpose. It tries to sign; obeys a "you are now the certifier" injection; asks for a determination before checking records or withou…Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST01
LOW
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsweb/index.html:327 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions · informational: not an instruction file<summary>What if it’s wrong?</summary><p>A human certifier reviews every determination. When the panel disagrees, Counted says so and shows each examiner’s viewFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsweb/index.html:325 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions · informational: not an instruction file<summary>Why does counting matter if the person is already gone?</summary><p>Two reasons. The family may be owed FEMA funeral assistance, which needs the disastFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedevals/guard_ablation.py:26 · Python subprocess execution detectedout = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "pytest", "tests/test_redteam.py", "-q", "-rf", "--no-header",Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detecteddeploy/ecs_redeploy.py:59 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["docker", "build", "--platform", "linux/amd64", "-t", image, "."], check=True, cwd=ROOT)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detecteddeploy/ecs_redeploy.py:60 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["docker", "push", image], check=True, cwd=ROOT)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detecteddeploy/agentcore_deploy.py:148 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([sys.executable, str(root / "deploy/agentcore_package.py")], check=True, cwd=root)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detecteddeploy/agentcore_package.py:43 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["uv", "pip", "install", "--python-platform", "aarch64-manylinux2014", "--python-version", PYTHON,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detecteddeploy/ecs_redeploy.py:45 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(cmd, check=True, capture_output=True, text=True, cwd=ROOT, **kw).stdout.strip()Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detecteddeploy/ecs_redeploy.py:57 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["docker", "login", "--username", user, "--password-stdin", registry], input=password, text=True,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈31 tok
1 file · 79 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.