Skills/Glama/common-ground

common-ground@0.1.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "A remote MCP server that returns group-aware recommendations scored against each person's taste profile, plus taste-tag lookups, so any agent can plan options that fit everyone rather than the average." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher s28066226-max · publishing for 2 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 2d ago
$npx skills add common-ground
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
GEMINI_API_KEYQLOO_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: GEMINI_MODEL, NEXT_PUBLIC_REPO_URL, QLOO_BASE_URL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso qloo.com, openstreetmap.org, google.com, spotify.com, youtube.com, justwatch.com, goodreads.com, 5gvci.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names qloo.com, openstreetmap.org, google.com, spotify.com, youtube.com, justwatch.com, goodreads.com, 5gvci.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects GEMINI_API_KEY, QLOO_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 88/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/check-qloo.mjs:2 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// Usage: node --env-file=.env.local scripts/check-qloo.mjsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/check-qloo.mjs:6 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif (!KEY) throw new Error("Set QLOO_API_KEY (e.g. in .env.local)");Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈208 tok
2 files · 32 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.