Skills/Glama/codemode-node

codemode-node@0.1.3

VERIFIED

Publisher claims: "Enables agents to accomplish multi-step work by writing a single sandboxed JavaScript program that drives shell, filesystem, HTTP, and every tool of any configured MCP server, returning only a small summary instead of raw JSON. This collapses dozens of advertised tool schemas into one tool, cutting per-request context by roughly 26× while keeping disabled upstream servers reachable." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher a-saeedia · publishing for 2 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 2d ago
$npx skills add codemode-node
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Coverage

Server started and answered tools/list.
Tested
MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
CF_TOKENCLOUDFLARE_API_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: CLOUDFLARE_ACCOUNT_ID, CODEMODE_CONFIG, CODEMODE_DEBUG, CODEMODE_ROOT, CODEMODE_TIMEOUT_MS, MOLI_BIN
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso cloudflare.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names cloudflare.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects CF_TOKEN, CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 24 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
3.8sprocessdependency install exit 0
24sclaimed1 tool: code
24stools0c279130bb88e73b
24sprocessscript backend runs setup only
24sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/host.mjs:52 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files{ cwd, timeout, maxBuffer: 8 * 1024 * 1024, env: { ...BASE_ENV, ...env }, windowsHide: true },Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/server.mjs:24 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files- console.log output is captured host-side but is NOT returned — collect progress in an array and return it.Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈37 tok
1 file · 21 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈1,090 tok
1 tool · 1090 per tool
Handshake
430 ms
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 3904

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

codemode-node@0.1.3 safety verdict: Verified — KillerSkills