Skills/Glama/clearcote-mcp

clearcote-mcp@r1

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Drive Clearcote, a Chromium build with its fingerprint protection patched into the engine, from any MCP client: about 20 tools to navigate, read, extract, click, fill, screenshot and keep sessions, plus a CDP endpoint that hands the same browser to Playwright or Puppeteer. The server lives in the repo's mcp/ folder (npx clearcote-mcp or pip install clearcote-mcp)." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher clearcotelabs · publishing for 128 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 3d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
CC_SECRETS_FILECLEARCOTE_API_KEYCLEARCOTE_LICENSE_KEYGITHUB_TOKENOPENROUTER_API_KEYOWNER_TOKEN_LABELRUN_TOKEN_ENVSIGNING_KEY_FPR or --canvas-bridge-auth / --proxy-auth / --socks5-credentialsConfiguration, not credentials: CC_EXTRA_ARGS, CC_FINGERPRINT_PROFILE, CC_HEADLESS, CC_IDLE_EXIT_SECONDS, CC_LOCATION, CC_PROXY, CC_WEBRTC_IP, CCKEY, CLEARCOAT_BINARY, CLEARCOTE_AGENT_KEY, CLEARCOTE_API_URL, CLEARCOTE_AUTO_UPDATE, CLEARCOTE_BINARY, CLEARCOTE_BROWSER_VERSION, CLEARCOTE_CACHE, CLEARCOTE_CLOUD, CLEARCOTE_CRLSET, CLEARCOTE_CRLSET_DIR, CLEARCOTE_CRLSET_FILE, CLEARCOTE_CRLSET_URL, CLEARCOTE_DOCKER, CLEARCOTE_DOCKER_CACHE_VOLUME, CLEARCOTE_DOCKER_IDLE_EXIT, CLEARCOTE_DOCKER_IMAGE, CLEARCOTE_EXIT_CHECKIN, CLEARCOTE_EXIT_KEY, CLEARCOTE_GEOIP_TIMEOUT_SECONDS, CLEARCOTE_HELPER_DIR, CLEARCOTE_HELPER_PAIR_CODE, CLEARCOTE_HUMANIZE_ENGINE_CLICKS, CLEARCOTE_HUMANIZE_ENGINE_EXT, CLEARCOTE_HUMANIZE_TYPO_RATE
Where it talks to
clearcotelabs.com (its own)Also googlesource.com, coherence-a.test, probe-b.test, openrouter.ai, docker.com, ipify.org, icanhazip.com, ip-api.com, tool.example, mux.invalid — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names googlesource.com, coherence-a.test, probe-b.test, openrouter.ai, docker.com, ipify.org, icanhazip.com, ip-api.com, tool.example, mux.invalid as well as its own vendor. The guard injects CC_SECRETS_FILE, CLEARCOTE_API_KEY, CLEARCOTE_LICENSE_KEY, GITHUB_TOKEN, OPENROUTER_API_KEY, OWNER_TOKEN_LABEL, RUN_TOKEN_ENV, SIGNING_KEY_FPR only into requests to clearcotelabs.com (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets CC_SECRETS_FILE=clearcotelabs.com,CLEARCOTE_API_KEY=clearcotelabs.com,CLEARCOTE_LICENSE_KEY=clearcotelabs.com,GITHUB_TOKEN=clearcotelabs.com,OPENROUTER_API_KEY=clearcotelabs.com,OWNER_TOKEN_LABEL=clearcotelabs.com,RUN_TOKEN_ENV=clearcotelabs.com,SIGNING_KEY_FPR=clearcotelabs.com -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is clearcote-mcp@r1 safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration; Credential pass-through configuration; URL with embedded credentials. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationsdk/node/src/index.ts:1303 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtime…lePrivacySandbox, executablePath: exeOption, args, geoip, humanize, showCursor, autoUpdate, cacheDir, quiet, widevine, crlset, crlsetTimeout, version, licenseKey, licenseApiBase, licenseThroughProxy, offlineKey, releaseChannel, a…Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationsdk/node/src/launchopts.ts:567 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsconst { server, username, password } = proxy ? proxyCredentials(proxy) : { server: "", username: "", password: "" };Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialssdk/node/src/multiplex.ts:7 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking// chromium.connectOverCDP("http://127.0.0.1:9222?fingerprint=acct-2&proxy=socks5://u:p@host:1080&geoip=true")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationsdk/node/src/cloud.ts:54 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials"no Clearcote API key: pass apiKey or set CLEARCOTE_API_KEY (create a key in the Clearcote dashboard)";Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssdk/node/src/docker.ts:322 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst child = execFile(argv[0], argv.slice(1), { env: env ? { ...process.env, ...env } : process.env, timeout: timeoutMs, maxBuffer: 16 << 20, windowsHide: true },Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/02-host-toolchain.sh:14 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges# Run with sudo if you are not root.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationsdk/node/src/index.ts:1137 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtime…lePrivacySandbox, executablePath: exeOption, args, geoip, humanize, showCursor, autoUpdate, cacheDir, quiet, widevine, crlset, crlsetTimeout, version, licenseKey, licenseApiBase, licenseThroughProxy, offlineKey, releaseChannel, a…Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationsdk/node/src/download.ts:102 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtime/** URL of SHA256SUMS.txt.asc (auto-update only) for optional GPG verification. */Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialssdk/node/src/cli.ts:48 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking--proxy <url> proxy, e.g. http://user:pass@host:portFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationsdk/node/src/download.ts:104 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtime/** URL of the public signing key (auto-update only). */Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssdk/node/src/persona.ts:265 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst out = { ...env };Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssdk/node/src/persona.ts:195 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst probeEnv: Env = { ...env, CLEARCOTE_RUN_TOKEN: runToken }; // the probe runs after the licence gate, like every launchFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/02-host-toolchain.sh:16 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges|| sudo python3 build/install-build-deps.py --no-prompt \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/02-host-toolchain.sh:40 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x third_party/node/update_node_binaries 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationsdk/node/src/multiplex.ts:145 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials/** The raw accepted parameters (proxy credentials redacted), for the status page. */Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationsdk/node/src/index.ts:1662 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtime…y, disablePrivacySandbox, executablePath: exeOption, args: userArgs, geoip, autoUpdate, cacheDir, quiet, widevine, version, licenseKey, licenseApiBase, licenseThroughProxy, offlineKey, releaseChannel, a…Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationsdk/node/src/reqproxy.ts:50 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsconst { server, username, password } = proxyCredentials(proxy);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationsdk/node/src/launchopts.ts:587 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsexport function proxyCredentials(proxy: PwProxy): { server: string; username: string; password: string } {Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationsdk/node/src/index.ts:274 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials/** Keep the persona switches (seed, overrides, proxy credentials, canvas-bridge token) off theFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationsdk/node/src/reqproxy.ts:21 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsimport { proxyCredentials, type PwProxy } from "./launchopts.js";Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationsdk/node/src/index.ts:483 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtimereturn ensureBinary({ cacheDir: options.cacheDir, quiet: options.quiet, autoUpdate: options.autoUpdate });Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationsdk/node/src/multiplex.ts:267 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials/** Canonical form of an identity's launch options (proxy credentials included, never displayed). */Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationsdk/node/src/launchopts.ts:609 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsconst { server, username, password } = proxyCredentials(proxy);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/05-package.sh:55 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsfind "$STAGE" -type f \( -name '*.pak' -o -name '*.dat' -o -name '*.bin' -o -name '*.json' \) -exec chmod 0644 {} +Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
LOW
Authorization escalation languagepatches/README.md:37 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file…1), checked by actually drawing with them. | | `050-shadow-dom` | Closed shadow-root access (`Element::FakeShadowRoot()`; since 151 no longer exposed to pages, see `960`) …Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/verify_patches.py:197 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsdk/node/src/cloud.ts:15 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files// console.log(run.status, run.result?.output);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsdk/node/src/docker.ts:570 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// A normal exit removes what a caller never closed ("exit" handlers must be synchronous). Ctrl-C, a killFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/03-windows-sdk.sh:67 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsprintf '#!/bin/sh\nexit 0\n' > "$VC_DIR/bin/HostX64/x64/cl.exe"; chmod +x "$VC_DIR/bin/HostX64/x64/cl.exe"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/05-package.sh:66 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsfind "$STAGE/fonts" -type f -exec chmod 0644 {} +Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with suspicious TLDscripts/patch_markers.json:394 · URL with suspicious TLD — commonly used for phishing/malware…m a page hit a TLS-reflection endpoint and read the offered groups, e.g. fetch('https://tls.peet.ws/api/all').then(r=>r.json()).then(j=>j.tls) and inspect the supported_groups ext…Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/05-package.sh:54 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 0755 "$STAGE/chrome" "$STAGE/chrome-sandbox" "$STAGE/chrome_crashpad_handler"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈41 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim clearcotelabs: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  3. Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  6. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
Publish a new version to Glama, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim clearcotelabsPropose a patch to the maintainer