Skills/Glama/claude_code

claude_code@0.1.0

VERIFIED

Publisher claims: "Enables Codex to delegate coding tasks to a locally installed AI coding CLI over MCP, returning results, cost and turn metadata, and reusable session IDs for follow-up work." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher guiarch3-pixe · publishing for 2 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 2d ago
$npx skills add claude_code
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Server started and answered tools/list.
Tested
MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
DEEPSEEK_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: CLAUDE_BRIDGE_BASE_URL, CLAUDE_BRIDGE_CLAUDE_BIN, CLAUDE_BRIDGE_PROJECT_DIR
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso deepseek.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names deepseek.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects DEEPSEEK_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 89/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 24 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
3.8sprocessdependency install exit 0
24sclaimed1 tool: claude_run
24sprocessscript backend runs setup only
24sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsserver.js:11 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// Config (override via env vars in Codex's [mcp_servers.*.env])Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

No other findings across 1,761 lines in 9 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈41 tok
1 file · 9 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈323 tok
1 tool · 323 per tool
Handshake
357 ms
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 153

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

claude_code@0.1.0 safety verdict: Verified — KillerSkills