chrome-store-mcp@0.1.0
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Enables AI assistants to inspect Chrome Web Store status, metrics, ratings, and reviews, and to upload, publish, roll back, or adjust rollout of extension versions, with human confirmation for changes that affect users." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
Code inventory arrives with this version's next honeypot run.- It will ask for
- unknown until the next run
- Where it talks to
- unknown until the next run
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Not enough was observed to say yet. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. This version's code has not been inventoried for credentials and hosts either; both arrive with its next honeypot run (popular servers first). `vet-skills try chrome-store-mcp` runs it now and prints the full answer.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
| `createConfirm`, `auto` and `dialog` and `elicit` branches | `test/units.test.ts`: "mode none never asks; dialog mode refuses without a desktop"; `test/tools.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.# The way users install it (npx from GitHub) runs the `prepare` build and the packed files only.Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.assert.equal(cleanForDialog('a <b>b</b> & c\u0007'), 'a bb/b c');Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.for (const zipPath of [fake, 'relative.zip', join(folder, 'missing.zip'), '/etc/passwd']) {Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.| `TokenSource.get` in `src/auth/tokens.ts` | `test/auth.test.ts`: "asks for the read-only scope for reads and caches the token", "refuses a read token that repFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.