chatgpt-desktop-mcp@0.4.0
CAUTION· startup onlyPublisher claims: "Enables other agents to list, read, start, and steer Codex chats in the macOS ChatGPT desktop app, including sending follow-ups, choosing model/reasoning/speed, interrupting work, and answering approvals. It can run locally or behind bearer-token-protected tunnels for remote monitoring and control." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
- Needs
- --tunnel-credentials — give it to the server where it runs, through vet-skills run --secrets, so the value never enters the server's environment. Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report.
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
CDM_TOKENor--tunnel-credentialsConfiguration, not credentials: CDM_URL, CHATGPT_DESKTOP_MCP_CODEX_BIN, CHATGPT_DESKTOP_MCP_CONFIG_DIR, CHATGPT_DESKTOP_MCP_LOG, CODEX_HOME, TUNNEL_ORIGIN_CERT- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso apple.com, cloudflare.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names apple.com, cloudflare.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects CDM_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration; Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration; HTTP URL with a raw public IP address. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 24 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
program: [cloudflared, 'tunnel', '--no-autoupdate', '--loglevel', 'warn', '--config', tunnelConfig, 'run', tunnelId],Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.program: [cloudflared, 'tunnel', '--no-autoupdate', '--loglevel', 'warn', '--config', tunnelConfig, 'run', tunnelId],Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.if (!publicOk) internet = await probeHealth('https://1.1.1.1/cdn-cgi/trace', 5_000);Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.if (!publicOk) internet = await probeHealth('https://1.1.1.1/cdn-cgi/trace', 5_000);Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.internet = await probeHealth('https://1.1.1.1/cdn-cgi/trace', 5_000);Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.expect(() => normalizeMachineUrl('https://user:[email protected]')).toThrow(/token/);Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."build": "tsc -p tsconfig.json && chmod +x dist/cli.js",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.internet = await probeHealth('https://1.1.1.1/cdn-cgi/trace', 5_000);Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim kevinrss01: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- HTTP URL with a raw public IP address≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
- URL using a raw public IP address≈ +2 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
- URL with embedded credentials≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.