Skills/Glama/chaoxing

chaoxing@0.1.0

VERIFIED· startup only

Publisher claims: "Enables agents to scan course structures, play videos at real 1x speed, track document task completion, capture quiz screenshots for vision-model reading, select and submit answers, and verify scores through MCP tools." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher nairocy · publishing for 3 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 8 h ago
$npx skills add chaoxing
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Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso chaoxing.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it under the guard. Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 84/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 20 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
20sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · --mil 视频优先模式(内嵌测验课:播完即过,测验另做) --skip-work 跳过独立测验/讨论节点 --budget 1800 单轮时间预算(秒,节点边界生效) --dry-run 只观察不操作
20sprocessscript backend runs setup only
20sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp.mjs:119 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst opts = { course: c, env: { ...env, ...(a.cpi ? { CX_CPI: String(a.cpi) } : {}) }, timeoutMs: 180000 };Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/core/engine.mjs:92 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesexecFileSync('bash', ['-lc', `ps ax -o pid=,command= | grep -F ${q} | grep -v grep | awk '{print $1}' | xargs -r kill -9`], { stdio: 'ignore' });Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈34 tok
1 file · 18 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.