Skills/Glama/chalk

chalk@0.1.0

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Enables Claude Code in any project to read canvas frames, screenshots, and design guidelines so it can build the designs in code." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher rizaardiyanto1412 · publishing for 3 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 3d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
CHALK_PEXELS_API_KEYCHALK_UNSPLASH_ACCESS_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: CHALK_APP_PATH, CHALK_CLAUDE_PATH, CHALK_CODEX_PATH, CHALK_CONNECT_BIN, CHALK_E2E_ARTIFACTS, CHALK_PARALLEL_CASES, CHALK_PORT, CHALK_PROJECT_DIR, ELECTRON_RENDERER_URL
Where it talks to
chalk-fixture.test (its own)Also claude.com, evil.example, example.test, google.com, jsdelivr.net, gstatic.com, unsplash.com, pexels.com, wikimedia.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names claude.com, evil.example, example.test, google.com, jsdelivr.net, gstatic.com, unsplash.com, pexels.com, wikimedia.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects CHALK_PEXELS_API_KEY, CHALK_UNSPLASH_ACCESS_KEY only into requests to chalk-fixture.test (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets CHALK_PEXELS_API_KEY=chalk-fixture.test,CHALK_UNSPLASH_ACCESS_KEY=chalk-fixture.test -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 72/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; document.cookie access; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/perf/css-parity.mjs:14 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst app = await electron.launch({ args: [root, `--user-data-dir=${join(out, 'profile')}`], cwd: root, env: { ...env, CHALK_PROJECT_DIR: project, CHALK_PORT: '8795' } })Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
document.cookie accessscripts/parallel-e2e.mjs:327 · document.cookie access — can steal session cookies…button><p id="cookie"></p><script>document.querySelector('#cookie').textContent=document.cookie</script></body>`, { headers: { 'content-type': 'text/html' } }) }) …Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/perf/bench.mjs:106 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst app = await electron.launch({ args: [root, `--user-data-dir=${join(fx.dir, `profile-${port}`)}`], cwd: root, env: { ...env, CHALK_PROJECT_DIR: fx.project, CHALK_PORT: String(port) } })Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/main/worker.ts:136 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkmcpServers: { chalk: { type: 'http', url: cfg.mcpUrl, headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${cfg.token}` }, alwaysLoad: true } },Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/main/agent.ts:96 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkmcpServers: { chalk: { type: 'http', url: this.mcpUrl(), alwaysLoad: true } },Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/agent-run.mjs:35 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesapp = await electron.launch({ args: [root], cwd: root, env: { ...env, CHALK_PROJECT_DIR: project, CHALK_PORT: String(PORT) } })Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/main/connectAgents.ts:261 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network{ label: 'Or add this to your agent’s MCP config', text: pretty({ mcpServers: { chalk: { type: 'http', url } } }) }Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)scripts/build-with-claude.sh:9 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network--mcp-config "{\"mcpServers\":{\"chalk\":{\"type\":\"http\",\"url\":\"http://127.0.0.1:$PORT/mcp\"}}}" --strict-mcp-config \Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/e2e.mjs:273 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesawait fail('code_read', { path: '.env' }, /excluded/)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/e2e.mjs:269 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesassert.doesNotMatch(listed, /\.env|secrets\.json|node_modules/)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialssrc/main/frameHtml.ts:19 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking<link href="https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Inter:[email protected]&display=swap" rel="stylesheet">Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/e2e.mjs:244 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileswriteFileSync(join(repo, '.env'), 'API_KEY=ENV_SECRET_VALUE\n')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/main/codebase.ts:9 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files…a', '.vscode']) /** Files that commonly hold credentials. */ const SECRET = /^(\.env(\..*)?|.*\.(pem|key|p12|pfx|keystore|jks|der|crt|cer)|id_(rsa|dsa|ecdsa|ed25519…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedpackage.json:15 · Destructive file system command detected"install-app": "npm run dist && codesign --force --deep --sign - dist/mac-arm64/Chalk.app && rm -rf /Applications/Chalk.app && cp -R dist/mac-arm64/Chalk.app /Applications/Chalk.app",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/agent-run.mjs:23 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst child = spawn(packaged, ['--remote-debugging-port=9399'], { env: { ...env, CHALK_PROJECT_DIR: project, CHALK_PORT: String(PORT) }, stdio: 'ignore' })Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈35 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

8 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim rizaardiyanto1412: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. document.cookie access≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  4. URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
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