Skills/Glama/cc-exporter

cc-exporter@0.2.0

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "Enables exporting Claude Code chat sessions to Markdown, HTML, or JSON, including full details such as thinking blocks, tool calls, diffs, and subagents, with optional secret redaction." Observed in sandbox: calls github.com only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher saieeshb · joined 0 days agoInstalls 0Last detonated 2 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios) on 2026-11-06 and scored it 57/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL; Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions; HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent. Summary: calls github.com only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 3 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.2snetworkCONNECT https://github.com
0.2snetworkCONNECT https://github.com
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/mktemp
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/rm
0.2sprocessexited 1: ✗ Could not download main.
0.3snetworkCONNECT https://github.com
0.3snetworkCONNECT https://github.com
0.4sfilesystemread ~/.claude/projects outside project
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/date
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.4sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 0)
0.4sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.5sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.6snetworkCONNECT https://github.com
0.6snetworkCONNECT https://github.com
0.6sprocessexec /usr/bin/faketime
0.6sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.6sprocessexec /usr/bin/mktemp
0.6sprocessexec /usr/bin/rm
0.6sprocessexited 1: ✗ Could not download main.
0.7snetworkCONNECT https://github.com
0.7snetworkCONNECT https://github.com
0.7sprocessexec /usr/bin/faketime

Static findings

MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageskills/export-transcripts/SKILL.md:17 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known package.github/workflows/test.yml:70 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellinstall.sh:3 · Remote installer piped to shellFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandinstall.sh:53 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagelib/setup.mjs:57 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagetest/setup.test.mjs:65 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLinstall.sh:3 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code sourceFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:235 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentskills/export-transcripts/SKILL.md:12 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentskills/export-transcripts/SKILL.md:18 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known package.github/workflows/test.yml:71 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagetest/setup.test.mjs:121 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagelib/setup.mjs:44 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:125 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagetest/setup.test.mjs:128 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patterninstall.sh:3 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codeFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagelib/setup.mjs:45 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,143 tok
3 files · 42 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

23 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim saieeshb: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Touches files outside the project≈ +7 on the totalKeep reads and writes inside the working directory, or declare the exact paths in `filesystem:` and explain why in the README.
  4. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  5. Does not do what the description says≈ +5 on the totalIn the sandbox the skill never performed the task it claims (no call to the service it is for). Make sure the happy path runs without extra setup, or describe the real behavior.
  6. Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
Publish a new version to Glama, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim saieeshbPropose a patch to the maintainer