Skills/Glama/cc-codex-mcp

cc-codex-mcp@0.1.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Enables Claude Code agents and subagents to get an independent read-only review of their changes from OpenAI Codex and to continue that same Codex conversation later for re-checks. Runs each request in an isolated CODEX_HOME so those threads stay separate from the Codex desktop app, supporting parallel callers and per-call model, effort, sandbox, and timeout settings." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher nttestalert · publishing for 2 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 2 h ago
$npx skills add cc-codex-mcp
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Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
2 of 2 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it under the guard. Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 84/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sprocessexited 1: (Use `node --trace-warnings ...` to show where the warning was created)
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.4sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.4sprocess2 of 2 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.4sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.4sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.4sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/index.ts:434 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// Wait for in-flight calls to kill their process trees (and release thread locks), but not forever.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/index.ts:29 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes/** On shutdown, wait at most this long for in-flight tool calls to kill their Codex process trees. */Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/runner.ts:451 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// Resolve after any in-flight kill finishes so no descendants outlive the call.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/runner.ts:19 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes/** Cancellation -> kill the process tree. */Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/util.test.mjs:23 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesassert.ok(!isUuid('../etc/passwd'));Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/runner.ts:461 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// If stdio is still held open (e.g. kill failed for some descendant), don't hang forever.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/runner.ts:459 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// Already settled (the kill finished after close/exit): no guard needed, and none must outlive the call.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/runner.ts:455 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesconst kill = () => {Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)test/fixtures/sync/source.toml:25 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network[mcp_servers.beta.http_headers]Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈37 tok
1 file · 31 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.