cad-eye-mcp@1.0.0
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Enables an AI to open and operate a CAD viewer for DXF, DWG, and Gerber/Excellon files, zooming, panning, clicking entities, toggling layers, and measuring while receiving updated screens and exact drawing data." Observed in sandbox: sends data to release-assets.githubusercontent.com.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso githubusercontent.com, autodesk.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · contacted release-assets.githubusercontent.com (undeclared)
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Find out what these hosts are first. In the honeypot it contacted release-assets.githubusercontent.com, which nothing in the package names as its own. If that is the vendor's service, fine; if you cannot place it, do not connect it.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 67/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Summary: sends data to release-assets.githubusercontent.com.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 3 scenariosStatic findings
proc = subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, "-I", "-m", "cad_eye_mcp"], stdin=subprocess.PIPE,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.out = subprocess.run([str(exe), "--version"], capture_output=True, text=True,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.self._proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.call([sys.executable, "-I", "-m", "cad_eye_mcp", "--check"], env=dict(os.environ))Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
13 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Contacts a host you did not declare≈ +23 on the totalList every host you talk to in SKILL.md frontmatter (`network: [api.example.com]`), or stop contacting the ones you cannot justify.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim trajis-tech: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.