Skills/Glama/bnbloc-browser

bnbloc-browser@0.7.5

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Enables an agent in a bnbloc room to drive a dedicated, visible Chrome profile one step at a time toward a stated goal, typing supplied values and pausing at checkpoints before anything irreversible, when only a person can supply a value, or before leaving the site so people can watch or take over." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher luckylhb90 · publishing for 10 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 39 min ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso example.net, example.org, evil.test — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it under the guard. Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 75/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials; Credential pass-through configuration; Credential pass-through configuration. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.1sprocess1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

CRITICAL
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentialsrun.go:336 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineeringwaitSecret = "Type the password in the page, then let the agent continue"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationmain.go:70 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialstoken: strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(pkgmeta.RoomRelayTokenEnv)),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
MEDIUM
Process kill commandchrome_test.go:254 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill := func(pid int) {Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationmain.go:73 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsfmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "bnbloc-browser: %s and %s are required (the bridge sets them for a room-credential tool)\n", pkgmeta.RoomRelayURLEnv, pkgmeta.RoomRelayTokenEnv)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈38 tok
1 file · 49 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

5 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim luckylhb90: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  5. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
Publish a new version to Glama, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim luckylhb90Propose a patch to the maintainer