bilibili-skill@r1
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Exposes 37 MCP tools that let agents search and browse Bilibili videos, read comments and danmaku, and grab frames, subtitles, and trending content without logging in. Once authenticated via QR-code login, it also enables replying to comments, sending private messages and stickers, posting dynamics, managing favorites, and uploading videos." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- bilibili.com (its own)
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it under the guard. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. The code names no credential variable and talks to bilibili.com, its own; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is bilibili-skill@r1 safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 84/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
# 由宿主的 .env 用 BILI_AVOID_PATH 指向宿主的 data/ 目录。Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.mcp_server.bili_send_opus("标题", "正文", images=["https://x/a.jpg"])Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.completed = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.mcp_server.bili_send_dynamic("hi", images=["https://x/a.jpg"])Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.