Skills/Glama/bidwire

bidwire@1.0.0

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Lets shopping agents turn a single purchase into a live auction where merchants bid, verifies every bid against the merchant's real product page and checkout, and ranks the surviving offers on merit rather than fees. It enforces spending limits with text-based human approval, then settles approved purchases in a double-entry ledger." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher vnmoorthy · publishing for 4 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
6 of 6 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
INKBOX_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: APPROVER_PHONE, AUCTION_MS, BIDWIRE_DB, BIDWIRE_KEY, DIRECTOR_KEY, INKBOX_IDENTITY, PUBLIC_URL, RECEIPT_EMAIL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for INKBOX_API_KEY and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 75/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions; Access to sensitive file paths; Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/mktemp
0.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/rm
0.0sprocessexited 127: ./scripts/claude-merchant.sh: line 9: claude: command not found
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/mktemp
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/rm
0.1sprocessexited 127: ./scripts/claude-shopper.sh: line 9: claude: command not found
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.3sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.4sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.5sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.5sprocess6 of 6 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.5sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.5sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.5sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)scripts/claude-shopper.sh:8 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkprintf '{"mcpServers":{"bidwire":{"type":"http","url":"%s","headers":{"Authorization":"Bearer %s"}}}}' "$URL" "${BIDWIRE_KEY:-bw_buy_claude_demo}" > "$CFG"Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:714 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary><b>Is it a real exchange?</b></summary> The mechanics are real: auctions run on timers, bids are verified by fetching storefront pages and checkout quoFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsserver/src/env.ts:4 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filestry { process.loadEnvFile(".env"); } catch { /* ignore malformed .env */ }Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:336 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary><b>Anything else</b></summary> Any MCP client that speaks streamable HTTP can connect to `/mcp` directly; stdio-only clients can bridge with [`mcp-remoFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageserver/src/http.ts:73 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code…k("b_chatgpt")}\nAuthentication: none\n(ChatGPT needs a public HTTPS URL: run \`npx mcp-use dev --tunnel\` or deploy to Manufact.)` }, { client: "codex", title: "Cod…Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsserver/src/env.ts:3 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif (existsSync(".env")) {Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)scripts/claude-merchant.sh:8 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkprintf '{"mcpServers":{"bidwire":{"type":"http","url":"%s"}}}' "$URL" > "$CFG"Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
LOW
Prompt injectionREADME.md:327 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction fileSettings → Apps & Connectors → Advanced → Developer mode → Create connectorFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:327 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction fileSettings → Apps & Connectors → Advanced → Developer mode → Create connectorFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈32 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

5 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim vnmoorthy: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  5. MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
  6. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
Publish a new version to Glama, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim vnmoorthyPropose a patch to the maintainer