Skills/Glama/bellman

bellman@0.9.4

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Enables MCP-connected agent sessions across different providers and machines to collaborate in shared rooms, joining via relayable codes to preview and exchange briefs, messages, artifacts, action requests, and a shared read-only working surface. Also serves A2A-speaking agents through a public-room endpoint." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher bellman-sh · publishing for 0 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 2 h ago
$npx skills add bellman
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
MAX_CLIENT_SECRET_CHARSConfiguration, not credentials: BELLMAN_BUS_ROOT, BELLMAN_DOOR_ROOT, BELLMAN_HOSTED_SEAT, BELLMAN_KEYS, BELLMAN_URL, SEND_EMAIL, STRANGER_KEY_PREFIX, SUN_PATH_MAX_BYTES
Where it talks to
bellman.sh (its own)Also cloudflare-dns.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names cloudflare-dns.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects MAX_CLIENT_SECRET_CHARS only into requests to bellman.sh (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets MAX_CLIENT_SECRET_CHARS=bellman.sh -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 91/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/index.ts:41 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkconsole.error(`bellman-mcp-server listening on http://localhost:${port}/mcp`);Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04

No other findings across 14,898 lines in 80 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈10,839 tok
3 files · 80 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.