Skills/Glama/bella

bella@1.0.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Enables Claude to answer business questions against a company's retail database — sales summaries, top customers, inventory alerts, customer profiles, and plain-English queries — through read-only SQL tools plus a schema resource and reporting prompt. Access is governed by OAuth 2.1 roles and scopes, column-level PII masking, a SQL guard, rate limits, and audit logging." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher victor-velazquez-ai · publishing for 1 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 18 h ago
$npx skills add bella
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ANTHROPIC_API_KEYBELLA_AUTH_MODEBELLA_JWT_SIGNING_KEYGITHUB_CLIENT_SECRETOPENAI_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: BELLA_AUDIT_LOG, BELLA_BRAIN, BELLA_CLAUDE_BIN, BELLA_DB_PATH, BELLA_GITHUB_DEFAULT_ROLE, BELLA_GITHUB_ROLES, BELLA_HOME, BELLA_HOST, BELLA_JWKS_URI, BELLA_JWT_AUDIENCE, BELLA_JWT_ISSUER, BELLA_LOCAL_ROLE, BELLA_MAX_ROWS, BELLA_MODEL, BELLA_PORT, BELLA_PUBLIC_URL, BELLA_QUERY_TIMEOUT_MS, BELLA_RATE_LIMIT_PER_SECOND, GITHUB_CLIENT_ID, MOCK
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso claude.com, brightline.local — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names claude.com, brightline.local as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, BELLA_AUTH_MODE, BELLA_JWT_SIGNING_KEY, GITHUB_CLIENT_SECRET, OPENAI_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 83/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/bella_mcp/config.py:1 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Settings, read once from the environment (and .env).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/bella_mcp/brain.py:166 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:14 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsRUN useradd --create-home bella && mkdir -p /app/logs && chown -R bella /appFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_brain.py:64 · Destructive file system command detectedquestion = 'top products" & del /q * | "'Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedverify.py:37 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run([sys.executable, *args], cwd=ROOT, env={**os.environ, "MOCK": "1"},Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/bella_mcp/config.py:26 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesload_dotenv(ROOT / ".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈41 tok
1 file · 34 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.