Skills/Glama/badland-brain

badland-brain@0.1.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Provides a single self-hosted memory that any MCP client can read and write, combining keyword and vector search with facts that keep their history as they change. Entries carry per-agent keys and provenance, and secret-shaped content is refused, so multiple coding agents can share one trustworthy record." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher coletebou · publishing for 1 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 19 h ago
$npx skills add badland-brain
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso example.invalid, brain.example — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it under the guard. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 81/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/config.ts:44 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files* `.env.example` documents each one.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesREADME.md:153 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction fileAdd something like this to `CLAUDE.md`, `AGENTS.md` or your client's instructions:Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/auth/keys.ts:138 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsthis.logger.warn('keys file is readable by other users; run chmod 600 on it', { file });Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/test-support/brain.ts:6 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesloadBrainConfig({ BRAIN_EMBED_PROVIDER: 'fake', BRAIN_EMBED_DIMS: '32', BRAIN_DATA_DIR: '/nonexistent/badland-brain-test', ...env });Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:21 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsRUN mkdir -p /data && chown node:node /dataFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/http/app.ts:281 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesres.status(400).json({ ok: false, code: 'bad_input', error: 'The request body is not valid JSON.' });Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/cli.ts:25 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesserve Start the server (settings come from BRAIN_* variables; see .env.example)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/http/app.ts:174 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesres.status(405).json({ ok: false, code: 'method_not_allowed', error: 'POST JSON-RPC to /mcp.' });Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/http/app.ts:59 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesres.status(400).json({ ok: false, code: 'bad_input', error: issue ? `${issue.path.join('.') || 'input'}: ${issue.message}` : 'Invalid input' });Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/http/app.ts:217 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesres.status(400).json({ ok: false, code: 'bad_input', error: 'x-brain-source must be a slug and may not be a reserved lineage system' });Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/auth/keys.test.ts:120 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsexpect(warnings.some((w) => w.includes('chmod 600'))).toBe(process.platform !== 'win32');Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈37 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.