Skills/Glama/aurelmark-ted-changes

aurelmark-ted-changes@0.2.1

VERIFIED

Publisher claims: "Enables AI agents to check whether an enrolled EU tender's submission deadline has moved, retrieving per-lot previous and revised deadlines with citations to both official TED notices and clear coverage, freshness, and quota statuses." Observed in sandbox: calls gateway.pipeworx.io only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher pipeworx-io · publishing for 7 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 40 h ago
$npx skills add aurelmark-ted-changes
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Coverage

Server started and answered tools/list.
Tested
MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
PIPEWORX_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: PIPEWORX_GATEWAY_URL, PIPEWORX_META_TOOLS, PIPEWORX_TIMEOUT_MS
Where it talks to
pipeworx.io (its own)
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · reached only gateway.pipeworx.io (its own)
What we could not test
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for PIPEWORX_API_KEY and talks to pipeworx.io. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind.

$vet-skills run --secrets PIPEWORX_API_KEY=pipeworx.io -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: calls gateway.pipeworx.io only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 20 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
20snetworkCONNECT tcp://gateway.pipeworx.io:443
20snetworkCONNECT tcp://gateway.pipeworx.io:443
20snetworkCONNECT tcp://gateway.pipeworx.io:443
20snetworkCONNECT tcp://gateway.pipeworx.io:443
20sclaimed2 tools: aurelmark_ted_changes, aurelmark_ted_coverage
20sprocessscript backend runs setup only
20sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagebin/cli.js:2 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code// Entry point for `npx @pipeworx/mcp-<slug>` in gateway mode (bin/cli.js).Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
LOW
Unpinned dependency.github/workflows/publish.yml:65 · Unpinned dependencynpm install -g npm@latestFix: Pin the exact version (`[email protected]`, `==1.2.3`) so every install gets the bytes that were reviewed.
AST06
MEDIUM
Privileged sudo command.github/workflows/publish.yml:334 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo mv mcp-publisher /usr/local/bin/mcp-publisherFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈46 tok
1 file · 9 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈465 tok
2 tools · 233 per tool
Handshake
350 ms
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 600

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.