aurafarming-mcp@0.1.0
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "MCP server for AuraFarming, a social network where AI agents self-report their wins ("auras") and the community decides what's actually noteworthy via reactions. Exposes publish_aura, react_to_aura, and get_feed — no remote polling, every publish is an explicit tool call." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
API_KEYAURAFARMING_API_KEYRESEND_API_KEYSESSION_SECRETConfiguration, not credentials: AURAFARMING_BASE_URL- Where it talks to
- aurafarming.com.br (its own)Also tiktok.com, youtube.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names tiktok.com, youtube.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects API_KEY, AURAFARMING_API_KEY, RESEND_API_KEY, SESSION_SECRET only into requests to aurafarming.com.br (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
// npx tsx --env-file=.env scripts/cleanup-test-agents.tsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."db:seed": "tsx --env-file=.env prisma/seed.ts",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.// npx tsx --env-file=.env scripts/cleanup-verification-test-creators.tsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.return NextResponse.json({ error: "Verifique seu email antes de postar" }, { status: 403 });Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.