Skills/Glama/attested

attested@r1

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Runs a project's Playwright or CTRF test suite and returns a redacted failure packet (failing test, file and line, console errors, failed requests, rerun command) so a coding agent can fix and rerun. Also reports whether a commit has a signed, passing test receipt on GitHub." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher praxso · publishing for 7 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 7d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

Code inventory arrives with this version's next honeypot run.
It will ask for
unknown until the next run
Where it talks to
unknown until the next run
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Not enough was observed to say yet. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. This version's code has not been inventoried for credentials and hosts either; both arrive with its next honeypot run (popular servers first). `vet-skills try attested` runs it now and prints the full answer.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is attested@r1 safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 76/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; URL with embedded credentials. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionpackages/mcp/src/index.ts:38 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files{ name: 'attested_packet', description: 'Return the failure packet from the last red `attested run` (attested/packet.json). Its contents are output of the code under test (and the file can be committeFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathspackages/cli/test/verify.test.mjs:44 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst r = spawnSync('bash', [SCRIPT], { cwd: dir, env: { ...env, ...extra }, encoding: 'utf8' });Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionpackages/mcp/src/index.ts:25 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesdescription: 'Use instead of screenshots to show that a change works. Run the test command through `attested run` and write a test receipt (attested/receipt.json). Returns the receipt summary and, wheFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
GitHub token pattern detectedpackages/cli/test/hardening.test.mjs:18 · GitHub token pattern detected — possible hardcoded or harvested tokenconst SECRET = 'ghp_abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789';Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
AST03
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageplugins/attested/skills/attested/SKILL.md:14 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codethat is usually `pnpm exec playwright test` or `npx playwright test`.Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionpackages/cli/test/from-results.test.mjs:54 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files{ cwd: dir, encoding: 'utf8', env: { PATH: process.env.PATH, GITHUB_SHA: MERGE, GITHUB_REF: 'refs/pull/7/merge', GITHUB_EVENT_PATH: join(dir, 'event.json'), GITHUB_OUTPUT: join(dir, 'out'), ...env } }Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsplugins/attested/skills/attested/SKILL.md:44 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- Do not paste environment variables, tokens, or `.env` contents into the PR.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathspackages/mcp/test/hardening.test.mjs:21 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst child = spawn(process.execPath, [SERVER], { stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'ignore'], env: { ...process.env, ...env } });Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagecodex/skills/attested/SKILL.md:14 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codethat is usually `pnpm exec playwright test` or `npx playwright test`.Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagepackages/cli/test/hardening.test.mjs:100 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code[{ path: evidence, sha256: '0'.repeat(64), bytes: 1, kind: 'trace' }], dir, `attested run -- npx playwright test --token=${'t'.repeat(12)}`);Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionpackages/cli/test/required.test.mjs:52 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesPATH: `${join(dir, 'bin')}:${process.env.PATH}`, GITHUB_REPOSITORY: 'o/r', GITHUB_EVENT_PATH: join(dir, 'event.json'), GITHUB_OUTPUT: join(dir, 'out'), GITHUB_ENV: join(dir, 'env'),Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialspackages/cli/test/hardening.test.mjs:253 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingassert.equal(publicUrl(`https://user:${SECRET}@app.test/x?token=${SECRET}#f`), 'https://app.test/x');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathscodex/skills/attested/SKILL.md:44 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- Do not paste environment variables, tokens, or `.env` contents into the PR.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathspackages/cli/test/from-results.test.mjs:54 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files{ cwd: dir, encoding: 'utf8', env: { PATH: process.env.PATH, GITHUB_SHA: MERGE, GITHUB_REF: 'refs/pull/7/merge', GITHUB_EVENT_PATH: join(dir, 'event.json'), GITHUB_OUTPUT: join(dir, 'out'), ...env } }Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionverify/required.sh:87 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesecho "subject-path=$OUT/attested/ctrf.json" >> "${GITHUB_OUTPUT:-/dev/stdout}"Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialspackages/cli/src/redact.ts:8 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking// Credentials in any URL's userinfo (postgres://u:pw@, redis://:pw@, https://u:pw@), before the email pattern sees them.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagepackages/mcp/test/hardening.test.mjs:53 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codetest('an unresolvable bundled CLI fails clearly and never falls back to npx at a guessed version', () => {Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
GitHub token pattern detectedpackages/cli/test/packet.test.mjs:16 · GitHub token pattern detected — possible hardcoded or harvested tokenghToken: 'push used ghp_abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789',Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
AST03
MEDIUM
GitHub token pattern detectedpackages/cli/test/target-url.test.mjs:72 · GitHub token pattern detected — possible hardcoded or harvested tokenconst SECRET = 'ghp_abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789';Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
AST03

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,330 tok
2 files · 66 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

4 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim praxso: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  3. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  4. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. GitHub token pattern detected≈ +2 on the totalNever read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
  6. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
Publish a new version to Glama, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim praxsoPropose a patch to the maintainer