Skills/Glama/arrgon

arrgon@r1

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Enables Google Gemini to autonomously read, write, search, and patch code files and run whitelisted developer commands inside a sandboxed local workspace for edit-and-verify coding workflows." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher omkar-ukirde · publishing for 2 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 2d ago
$npx skills add arrgon
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso google.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it under the guard. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is arrgon@r1 safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 81/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetest_mcp_coding_agent.py:232 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or deviceres = agent.run_command("rm -rf /")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmcp_coding_agent.py:188 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif file.startswith(".") and file not in {".env.example", ".gitignore", ".metadata"}:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetest_mcp_coding_agent.py:49 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or device"git status; rm -rf /",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp_coding_agent.py:446 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest_mcp_coding_agent.py:116 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesagent.resolve_safe_path("../../etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtest_mcp_coding_agent.py:49 · Destructive file system command detected"git status; rm -rf /",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Privileged sudo commandtest_mcp_coding_agent.py:70 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges"sudo flutter doctor",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtest_mcp_coding_agent.py:232 · Destructive file system command detectedres = agent.run_command("rm -rf /")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈33 tok
1 file · 8 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.