apptierlist@r1

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Gives AI agents read-only access to S-to-F tier lists of iPhone apps for roughly 1,200 use cases, with tools to search categories and apps, fetch a list's ranking or an app's full record, compare apps side by side, explain why an app sits where it does, and find alternatives or recent ranking changes." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher apptierlist · publishing for 3 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 3d ago

$npx skills add apptierlist

Watch Report an issue

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.

Tested: every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested: use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for: no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to: no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw: no credential files read · no network
What we could not test: use of the skill by an agent

Connect it under the guard. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is apptierlist@r1 safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 93/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations

t+CategoryObserved action

0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle

0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only

0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

LOW

Prompt injectionREADME.md:35 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file

**ChatGPT:** with developer mode on, add a connector with the server URL and no authentication. The `search` and `fetch` tools are the ones ChatGPT's connectors call.

Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.

AST01

LOW

Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:35 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file

**ChatGPT:** with developer mode on, add a connector with the server URL and no authentication. The `search` and `fetch` tools are the ones ChatGPT's connectors call.

Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.

AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded

≈387 tok

1 file · 8 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.