appie-mcp@0.5.0
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Enables AI assistants to connect to Albert Heijn supermarket services for product search, Bonus promotions, shopping lists, digital receipts, Allerhande recipes, store lookup, and profile/cart access while keeping checkout human-controlled." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- 1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
AH_REFRESH_TOKENAH_TOKEN_STORE_AUTHAH_TOKEN_STORE_URLAH_TOKENS_FILEAPPIE_REFRESH_TOKENAPPIE_TOKEN_STORE_AUTHAPPIE_TOKEN_STORE_URLAPPIE_TOKENS_FILELEGACY_TOKENS_FILE_ENV_VARMCP_HTTP_AUTH_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: APPIE_HEADLESS, APPIE_MCP_CACHE, APPIE_MCP_CACHE_MAX_ENTRIES, MCP_HTTP_ALLOWED_HOSTS, MCP_HTTP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS, MCP_HTTP_HOST, MCP_HTTP_JSON_RESPONSE, MCP_HTTP_PATH, MCP_HTTP_PORT, MCP_HTTP_SESSION_IDLE_MS, MCP_TRANSPORT, NODE_TEST_CONTEXT- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso ah.nl — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names ah.nl as well as its own vendor. The guard injects AH_REFRESH_TOKEN, AH_TOKEN_STORE_AUTH, AH_TOKEN_STORE_URL, AH_TOKENS_FILE, APPIE_REFRESH_TOKEN, APPIE_TOKEN_STORE_AUTH, APPIE_TOKEN_STORE_URL, APPIE_TOKENS_FILE, LEGACY_TOKENS_FILE_ENV_VAR, MCP_HTTP_AUTH_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
// Load local .env if presentFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."build": "tsc && chmod +x dist/index.js",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.console.log("\nRun 'npx appie-mcp login' to connect your personal Albert Heijn account.");Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.`[appie-mcp] WARNING: tokens were written to ${filePath} but chmod 600 failed ` +Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.