Skills/Glama/antemortem-cli

antemortem-cli@0.12.5

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Local code-citation checks, source-evidence grounding, and fail-closed review tools for AI coding agents." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher hibou04-ops · publishing for 7 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 7d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

Code inventory arrives with this version's next honeypot run.
It will ask for
unknown until the next run
Where it talks to
unknown until the next run
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Not enough was observed to say yet. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. This version's code has not been inventoried for credentials and hosts either; both arrive with its next honeypot run (popular servers first). `vet-skills try antemortem-cli` runs it now and prints the full answer.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 72/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/date
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.1sprocessexec .venv/bin/antemortem
0.1sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 0)
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/antemortem/commands/run.py:175 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileslist ``.env`` in the Recon protocol and it would get sent to the LLM.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/antemortem/file_safety.py:7 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesship `.env`, credential fixtures, or customer dumps to an external LLMFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/antemortem/commands/report.py:5 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesTakes a ``<doc>.json`` audit artifact (the output of ``antemortem run``)Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/antemortem/_run_metadata.py:30 · Python subprocess execution detectedcommit = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/antemortem/mcp/server.py:138 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# called ``read_text()`` directly, which let an agent ship ``.env``Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/antemortem/file_safety.py:37 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"**/.env.*",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/antemortem/schema.py:268 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files.env file was excluded by deny-glob (good) or never even triedFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationsrc/antemortem/providers/gemini_provider.py:54 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials"or GOOGLE_API_KEY, or pass api_key explicitly."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/antemortem/_run_metadata.py:41 · Python subprocess execution detectedstatus = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/antemortem/git_scope.py:45 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/antemortem/file_safety.py:36 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"**/.env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/antemortem/file_safety.py:35 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".env.*",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/generate_readme_claims.py:275 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/antemortem/mcp/server.py:219 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filescontract as ``antemortem run`` — deny-globs for .env / credentials /Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/benchmark_citation_io.py:42 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesdoc.with_suffix(".json").write_text(output.model_dump_json(), encoding="utf-8")Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/antemortem/mcp/server.py:243 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filespattern are skipped with a warning. Default covers .env,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/antemortem/templates.py:217 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes> **Purpose: kill the false positives before they make it to the spec.**Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/antemortem/file_safety.py:34 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/antemortem/commands/run.py:345 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"PEM keys). The default deny-list covers .env, .ssh, *.pem, "Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/antemortem/templates.py:336 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes- You want the Skeptic pass to kill false positivesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈39 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

8 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim hibou04-ops: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  5. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  6. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
Publish a new version to Glama, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim hibou04-opsPropose a patch to the maintainer