Skills/Glama/ameriflux-mcp

ameriflux-mcp@r1

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Enables agents to search AmeriFlux and FLUXNET eddy-covariance tower sites, check product and year availability, decode FLUXNET variable names and QC flags, and retrieve versioned citations and data-policy obligations. Also supports consented downloads and local previewing of AmeriFlux BASE/BADM, FLUXNET-1F, and FLUXNET2015 FULLSET/SUBSET files." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher idss-mesa · publishing for 5 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 5d ago
$npx skills add ameriflux-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso lbl.gov, fluxdata.org, githubusercontent.com, fluxnet.org, datacite.org, doi.org, astral.sh, opencode.ai, example.org, openxmlformats.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is ameriflux-mcp@r1 safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 82/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/uname
0.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.0sprocessexited 1: error: uv is not on PATH. Install uv (https://docs.astral.sh/uv/) or pass --command.
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/uname
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/dirname
0.3sprocessexited 1: error: uv is not on PATH. Install uv (https://docs.astral.sh/uv/) or pass --command.

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/install.sh:356 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesblock += f"\n[mcp_servers.{name}.env]\n" + "\n".join(f"{k} = {q(v)}" for k, v in env.items()) + "\n"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/install.sh:340 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Replace or append the [mcp_servers.<name>] table and its [mcp_servers.<name>.env] sub-table.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/ameriflux_mcp/transport/streamable_http.py:132 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkapp = mcp_server.streamable_http_app(Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/install.sh:345 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif t in (header, f"[mcp_servers.{name}.env]"):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈37 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

ameriflux-mcp@r1 safety verdict: Verified (not started) — KillerSkills