Skills/Glama/aliasflare

aliasflare@0.2.0

VERIFIED

Publisher claims: "Self-hosted email aliases on Cloudflare Workers (free tier). Agents can create/list/delete aliases, read recent messages and fetch verification codes." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher charleswei118 · publishing for 3 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 3d ago
$npx skills add aliasflare
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Coverage

Server started and answered tools/list.
Tested
MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ADMIN_TOKENALIASFLARE_TOKENBREVO_API_KEYRESEND_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: ALIASFLARE_URL, AUTO_CREATE, BANNER, BLOCK_TRACKERS, CODE_IN_SUBJECT, DESTINATION, DOMAIN, EMAIL, FORWARD_MODE
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso workers.dev, resend.com, brevo.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names workers.dev, resend.com, brevo.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ADMIN_TOKEN, ALIASFLARE_TOKEN, BREVO_API_KEY, RESEND_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 21 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
1.0sprocessdependency install exit 0
21sclaimed6 tools: create_alias, list_aliases, set_alias_enabled, get_latest_code, recent_messages, send_from_alias
21sprocessscript backend runs setup only
21sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontest/http.test.js:55 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesassert.match((await r.json()).error, /RESEND_API_KEY/);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known package.github/workflows/ci.yml:17 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code- run: npx wrangler deploy --dry-run --outdir distFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontest/http.test.js:71 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesassert.equal((await r.json()).via, "resend");Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL shortener detectedtest/util.test.js:22 · URL shortener detected — destination cannot be verified… const html = `<p>hi</p><img src="https://x.com/logo.png" width="120"><img src="https://t.co/a.gif" width="1" height="1"><img src="https://abc.list-manage.com/track/open.php…Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/email.js:125 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesawait store.log({ alias_id: alias.id, direction: "in", peer: sender, subject, code, pixels: removed });Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/email.js:120 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesawait store.log({ alias_id: alias.id, direction: "in", peer: sender, subject, code, pixels: removed, detail: `fallback forward: ${e.message}` });Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/email.js:86 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesawait store.log({ alias_id: alias.id, direction: "in", peer: sender, subject, code });Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈37 tok
1 file · 25 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈780 tok
6 tools · 130 per tool
Handshake
118 ms
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 202

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

aliasflare@0.2.0 safety verdict: Verified — KillerSkills