agy-bridge@r1
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "Zero-Terminal Cross-Agent Context Bus, Lifecycle Hook Sync, and MCP Server connecting Claude Code, Google Antigravity 2.0, OpenAI Codex, and WorkBuddy across shared git worktrees." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it under the guard. Install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is agy-bridge@r1 safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
chmod +x "$SCRIPT_DIR/agy-bridge"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends git && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.- **Claude Code / Desktop** (`~/.claude/settings.json` + `~/.claude.json`): `SessionStart`, `UserPromptSubmit`, `PostToolUse` (`Edit|Write|MultiEdit`), `Stop`, `StopFailure` + MCP server `agy_bridge`.Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.RUN chmod +x /usr/local/bin/agy-bridge && ln -s /usr/local/bin/agy-bridge /usr/local/bin/abFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.- **Claude Code / Desktop** (`~/.claude/settings.json` + `~/.claude.json`): `SessionStart`, `UserPromptSubmit`, `PostToolUse` (`Edit|Write|MultiEdit`), `Stop`, `StopFailure` + MCP server `agy_bridge`.Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(path), "init", "-q", "-b", "main"], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(path), "commit", "-q", "-m", "initial commit"], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(repo), "commit", "-q", "-m", "add CLAUDE.md"], check=True)Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.1. Secret redaction (.env, OpenAI, Anthropic, GitHub, Google, Slack, Bearer tokens)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(path), "config", "user.email", "[email protected]"], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(path), "add", "."], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(repo), "add", "CLAUDE.md"], check=True)Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(path), "config", "user.name", "Test User"], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.