Skills/Glama/agri-eco

agri-eco@0.9.0b0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Provides 14 agent-native agricultural tools for climate-zone matching, crop recommendations, pest and disease diagnosis, and reproducible environmental recipes, with offline zero-dependency operation." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher lm203688 · publishing for 168 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 6d ago
$npx skills add agri-eco
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
TYPESAFE_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: AGRI_BP_DB, AGRI_BP_LLM_KEY, AGRI_BP_LLM_MODEL, AGRI_BP_LLM_URL, AGRI_CROP_DB, AGRI_FEEDBACK_DRY_RUN, AGRI_FEEDBACK_LOG, AGRI_GH_BRANCH, AGRI_GH_REPO, AGRI_LIVE_TEST, AGRI_LONG_TERM_MEMORY, AGRI_MCP_AUDIT_LOG, AGRI_MEMORY_SYNTHETIC, AGRI_ORG_MEMORY, AGRI_SEARCH_INDEX, AGRI_VERIFY_NO_ISOLATE, AGRI_VISION_KEY, AGRI_VISION_MODEL, AGRI_VISION_URL, TYPESAFE_CRED_FILE
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso fao.org, isric.org, worldclim.org, nasa.gov, cgris.net, usda.gov, ipni.org, psu.edu, eppo.int, soilgrids.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names fao.org, isric.org, worldclim.org, nasa.gov, cgris.net, usda.gov, ipni.org, psu.edu, eppo.int, soilgrids.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects TYPESAFE_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 83/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/agri_cli.py:54 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- 校验前缀，防 ../../etc/passwd 这类越界Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/test_engine_v2.py:645 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfor bad in ("../etc/passwd", "../../x", os.path.join(os.path.dirname(ROOT), "nope.json")):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/test_conformal.py:395 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/build_mcpb.py:49 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesEXCLUDE_FILE_NAMES = {".env"}Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/drive_push.py:35 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(cmd, cwd=ROOT, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=600)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/check_doc_links.py:128 · Python subprocess execution detectedp = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=TIMEOUT_SEC + 10)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/sync_check.py:74 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesEXCLUDE_FILES = {".env"} # gitignored secret，不比对Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/test_mcp_server.py:59 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈3,118 tok
11 files · 80 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.