Skills/Glama/agent-memory

agent-memory@0.1.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Enables coding agents to search their own and other agents' sessions and existing Markdown memories locally through MCP, returning provenance-tagged fragments while keeping source files read-only. Indexing, embeddings, and reranking all run locally behind a single daemon with a SQLite index." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher sheepig · publishing for 0 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 8 h ago
$npx skills add agent-memory
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
EMBEDDING_MAX_INPUT_TOKENSRERANKER_MAX_INPUT_TOKENSConfiguration, not credentials: AGENT_MEMORY_DATA_DIR, AGENT_MEMORY_HOST, AGENT_MEMORY_PORT, AGENT_MEMORY_SCAN_INTERVAL, CODEX_HOME, SystemRoot
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso huggingface.co, deepseek.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names huggingface.co, deepseek.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects EMBEDDING_MAX_INPUT_TOKENS, RERANKER_MAX_INPUT_TOKENS only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 91/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/cli/index.ts:165 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesif (current.json || result.alreadyRunning) output(result, current.json);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

No other findings across 10,704 lines in 81 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈40 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.