Skills/Glama/agent-mcp

agent-mcp@0.2.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "An MCP server exposing read, write, edit, patch, glob, grep, shell, webfetch, and websearch tools with OpenCode-compatible names and parameters over Streamable HTTP or stdio. It lets an agent work in a root-confined workspace on another machine, with optional bearer-token authentication and guarded private-network and out-of-root access." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry GlamaPublisher uukelele · publishing for 7 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 7d ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Before you give it your token

Code inventory arrives with this version's next honeypot run.
It will ask for
unknown until the next run
Where it talks to
unknown until the next run
What the honeypot saw
nothing has run yet
What we could not test
everything: the server has not run yet

Run it before you trust it. Nothing has run yet: the code was read, the server was not. `vet-skills try` runs this exact version in the honeypot in about a minute.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 60/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_http.py:39 · Python subprocess execution detectedprocess = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/agent_mcp/tools/shell.py:74 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/agent_mcp/tools/search.py:299 · Python subprocess execution detectedprocess = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:14 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions&& chown mcp:mcp /workspaceFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/agent_mcp/tools/shell.py:193 · Python subprocess execution detectedprocess = subprocess.Popen(argv, **popen_kwargs) # type: ignore[arg-type]Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/agent_mcp/tools/shell.py:256 · Python subprocess execution detectedprocess = subprocess.Popen(argv, **kwargs) # type: ignore[arg-type]Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL to the cloud instance metadata addresstests/test_web.py:47 · URL to the cloud instance metadata address — reads the VM's credentialsself.send_header("Location", "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL to the cloud instance metadata addresstests/test_web.py:47 · URL to the cloud instance metadata address — reads the VM's credentialsself.send_header("Location", "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_web.py:135 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileswebfetch("file:///etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL to the cloud instance metadata addresstests/test_web.py:123 · URL to the cloud instance metadata address — reads the VM's credentials"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/", allow_private=TrueFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL to the cloud instance metadata addresstests/test_web.py:123 · URL to the cloud instance metadata address — reads the VM's credentials"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/", allow_private=TrueFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈33 tok
1 file · 24 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

20 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim uukelele: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  3. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  4. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  5. URL to the cloud instance metadata address≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  6. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
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