Skills/Glama/ableton-mcp

ableton-mcp@0.5.0

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "Enables MCP clients such as Claude Code to control Ableton Live 12.1+ through a stdlib-only Remote Script, covering tracks, Drum Rack kits, MIDI clips, playback, and undo, with offline .mid export when Live is closed." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry GlamaPublisher ok2ju · publishing for 6 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 6d ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
ableton.com (its own)
What the honeypot saw
nothing has run yet
What we could not test
everything: the server has not run yet

Run it before you trust it. Nothing has run yet: the code was read, the server was not. `vet-skills try` runs this exact version in the honeypot in about a minute.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 63/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_vital.py:150 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesvital.read_preset("/etc/passwd", tmp_path)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Authorization escalation languagedocs/ableton-mcp-research.md:193 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file- **Max for Live Developer Mode** (12.4) adds "Copy Max for Live Path" on UI elements ([Ableton KB](https://help.ableton.com/hc/en-us/articles/29426709984796)). Suite only in practice.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/ableton_mcp/doctor.py:107 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsreturn FAIL, f"{conn_file} has mode {mode:o}, expected 600", f"chmod 600 '{conn_file}'"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
LOW
Prompt injectiondocs/ableton-mcp-research.md:626 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file- [Max for Live Developer Mode](https://help.ableton.com/hc/en-us/articles/29426709984796)Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandtests/test_doctor.py:93 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsassert status == doctor.FAIL and "chmod 600" in fixFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
LOW
Prompt injectiondocs/ableton-mcp-research.md:193 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file- **Max for Live Developer Mode** (12.4) adds "Copy Max for Live Path" on UI elements ([Ableton KB](https://help.ableton.com/hc/en-us/articles/29426709984796)). Suite only in practice.Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Hex-encoded string detectedtests/test_midifile.py:48 · Hex-encoded string detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsassert b"\xff\x51\x03\x07\xa1\x20" in data # 500000 us/quarter = 120 BPMFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/ableton_mcp/vital.py:284 · Python subprocess execution detectedif subprocess.run(["pgrep", "-x", "Vital"], capture_output=True).returncode == 0: # 0: a process matchedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
LOW
Authorization escalation languagedocs/ableton-mcp-research.md:626 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file- [Max for Live Developer Mode](https://help.ableton.com/hc/en-us/articles/29426709984796)Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/ableton_mcp/doctor.py:149 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/ableton_mcp/vital.py:286 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.Popen([str(VITAL_BINARY), str(path)], start_new_session=True,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈33 tok
1 file · 30 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

17 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim ok2ju: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  4. Hex-encoded string detected≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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