terraform@r7
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
TFE_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: BIN_PATH, DOCKER_PATTERN, E2E_TEST_PORT, INSTANA_ENABLED, INSTANA_SERVICE_NAME, LOG_FORMAT, MCP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS, MCP_CORS_MODE, MCP_ENDPOINT, MCP_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL, MCP_ORGANIZATION_ALLOWLIST, MCP_RATE_LIMIT_GLOBAL, MCP_RATE_LIMIT_SESSION, MCP_REDIRECT_ROOT_URL, MCP_SESSION_MODE, MCP_TLS_CERT_FILE, MCP_TLS_KEY_FILE, OTEL_METRICS_ENABLED, OTEL_METRICS_ENDPOINT, OTEL_METRICS_EXPORT_INTERVAL, OTEL_METRICS_SERVICE_NAME, OTEL_METRICS_SERVICE_VERSION, TF_X_OFFICIAL_SDK_ENABLED, TRANSPORT_HOST, TRANSPORT_MODE, TRANSPORT_PORT- Where it talks to
- terraform.io (its own)Also allowed.com, evil.com, any-site.com, archivist.example, storage.example, githubusercontent.com, semver.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names allowed.com, evil.com, any-site.com, archivist.example, storage.example, githubusercontent.com, semver.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects TFE_TOKEN only into requests to terraform.io (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is terraform@r7 safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 88/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
// stopContainer stops one test container and falls back to kill if needed.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.input: "https://user:[email protected]/private/log",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."docker kill failed for %s: %v: %s",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.