Skills/Docker MCP Catalog/teamwork

teamwork@r1

VERIFIED

Publisher claims: "Tools for Teamwork.com products." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry Docker MCP CatalogPublisher teamwork · joined 0 days agoInstalls 12,084Last detonated 40 min ago
$docker run -i --rm mcp/teamwork
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Is teamwork@r1 safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario) on 2026-10-26 and scored it 84/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only

Static findings

CRITICAL
Prompt injectiondocs/usage/chat-gpt.md:10 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique referenceFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionAGENTS.md:155 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Authorization escalation languagedocs/usage/chat-gpt.md:10 · Authorization escalation languageFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Authorization escalation languagedocs/usage/README.md:33 · Authorization escalation languageFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
CRITICAL
Prompt injectiondocs/usage/chat-gpt.md:17 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique referenceFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionAGENTS.md:148 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionAGENTS.md:129 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Authorization escalation languageusage.md:33 · Authorization escalation languageFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionAGENTS.md:149 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionAGENTS.md:159 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Authorization escalation languagedocs/usage/chat-gpt.md:17 · Authorization escalation languageFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)internal/testutil/mcp.go:218 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)internal/testutil/mcp.go:300 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)AGENTS.md:144 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedplugins/review/demo.py:104 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:44 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05