smartbear@0.44.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "MCP server for AI access to SmartBear tools, including BugSnag, Reflect, API Hub, PactFlow." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry Docker MCP CatalogPublisher smartbear · publishing for 508 daysInstalls 15,520Last detonated 47 min ago
$docker run -i --rm mcp/smartbear
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Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
5 of 5 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
API_HUB_API_KEYBUGSNAG_AUTH_TOKENMCP_SERVER_BUGSNAG_API_KEYOAUTH_AUTHORIZATION_SERVER_URLSWAGGER_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: ALLOWED_ORIGINS, BASE_URL, CACHE_ENABLED, CACHE_TTL, DRIFT_HOME_DIR, DRIFT_PLUGIN_DIR, DUMMY_PORTAL_BASE_PATH, DUMMY_REGISTRY_BASE_PATH, MCP_SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT_MS, MCP_TRANSPORT, TRUST_PROXY, ZEPHYR_CUSTOM_BASE_URL
Where it talks to
smartbear.com (its own)Also qmetry.example, bugsnag.com, example.test, swaggerhub.com, base.com, api.com, my-custom-domain.com, domain.com, qtm4j.com, qmetry.com, portal-testing.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names qmetry.example, bugsnag.com, example.test, swaggerhub.com, base.com, api.com, my-custom-domain.com, domain.com, qtm4j.com, qmetry.com, portal-testing.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects API_HUB_API_KEY, BUGSNAG_AUTH_TOKEN, MCP_SERVER_BUGSNAG_API_KEY, OAUTH_AUTHORIZATION_SERVER_URL, SWAGGER_API_KEY only into requests to smartbear.com (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets API_HUB_API_KEY=smartbear.com,BUGSNAG_AUTH_TOKEN=smartbear.com,MCP_SERVER_BUGSNAG_API_KEY=smartbear.com,OAUTH_AUTHORIZATION_SERVER_URL=smartbear.com,SWAGGER_API_KEY=smartbear.com -- docker run -i --rm mcp/smartbear

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-17 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/git
0.1sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.3sprocessexited 1:
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.4sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.6sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.6sprocess5 of 5 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.6sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.6sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.6sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandpackage.json:38 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"build": "tsc && vite build && shx chmod +x dist/*.js",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialssrc/bugsnag/client.test.ts:663 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingconst customEndpoint = "https://user:[email protected]";Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/common/analytics.ts:416 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network* transport closes. One instance per {@link SmartBearMcpServer} in HTTP mode.Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagescripts/pack-mcpb.js:39 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeexecSync(`npx -y @anthropic-ai/mcpb clean ${outputFile}`, {Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
LOW
URL to a private-network addresssrc/bugsnag/client.test.ts:636 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development targetconst customEndpoint = "https://192.168.1.100:8080/api/v1";Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialssrc/bugsnag/client.test.ts:672 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking"https://user:[email protected]",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagescripts/pack-mcpb.js:36 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeexecSync(`npx -y @anthropic-ai/mcpb pack ${buildDir} ${outputFile}`, {Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈35 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.