Skills/Docker MCP Catalog/onlyoffice-docspace

onlyoffice-docspace@3.4.1

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "ONLYOFFICE DocSpace is a room-based collaborative platform which allows organizing a clear file structure depending on users' needs or project goals." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry Docker MCP CatalogPublisher onlyoffice · publishing for 575 daysInstalls 57,094Last detonated 12 h ago
$docker run -i --rm mcp/onlyoffice-docspace
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Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
onlyoffice.com (its own)Also rfc-editor.org, cursor.com, visualstudio.com, badgen.net, vscode.dev — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it under the guard. Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle. The code names no credential variable and talks to onlyoffice.com, its own; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- docker run -i --rm mcp/onlyoffice-docspace

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 83/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.2sprocess1 of 1 bundled script run with no arguments
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

LOW
Unpinned dependencypnpm-lock.yaml:421 · Unpinned dependencydeprecated: 'v1 is deprecated. Upgrade to v2: npm i @modelcontextprotocol/inspector@latest. v1 gets security fixes only, published under the v1-latest tag.'Fix: Pin the exact version (`[email protected]`, `==1.2.3`) so every install gets the bytes that were reviewed.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:22 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filespnpm serve # run app/main.ts with .env loadedFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:27 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- `scripts/env.ts` loads `.env` from the repo root for `serve`/`inspect`.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/env.ts:10 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesprocess.loadEnvFile(".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Unpinned dependencypnpm-lock.yaml:431 · Unpinned dependencydeprecated: 'v1 is deprecated. Upgrade to v2: npm i @modelcontextprotocol/inspector@latest. v1 gets security fixes only, published under the v1-latest tag.'Fix: Pin the exact version (`[email protected]`, `==1.2.3`) so every install gets the bytes that were reviewed.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/env.ts:9 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif (fs.existsSync(".env")) {Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Unpinned dependencypnpm-lock.yaml:426 · Unpinned dependencydeprecated: 'v1 is deprecated. Upgrade to v2: npm i @modelcontextprotocol/inspector@latest. v1 gets security fixes only, published under the v1-latest tag.'Fix: Pin the exact version (`[email protected]`, `==1.2.3`) so every install gets the bytes that were reviewed.
AST06
LOW
Unpinned dependencypnpm-lock.yaml:437 · Unpinned dependencydeprecated: 'v1 is deprecated. Upgrade to v2: npm i @modelcontextprotocol/inspector@latest. v1 gets security fixes only, published under the v1-latest tag.'Fix: Pin the exact version (`[email protected]`, `==1.2.3`) so every install gets the bytes that were reviewed.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,465 tok
2 files · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

onlyoffice-docspace@3.4.1 safety verdict: Verified (install only) — KillerSkills