Skills/Docker MCP Catalog/mapbox

mapbox@0.17.0

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Transform any AI agent into a geospatially-aware system with Mapbox APIs. Provides geocoding, POI search, routing, travel time matrices, isochrones, and static map generation." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry Docker MCP CatalogPublisher mapbox · publishing for 520 daysInstalls 36,508Last detonated 7d ago
$docker run -i --rm mcp/mapbox
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

Code inventory arrives with this version's next honeypot run.
It will ask for
unknown until the next run
Where it talks to
unknown until the next run
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Not enough was observed to say yet. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. This version's code has not been inventoried for credentials and hosts either; both arrive with its next honeypot run (popular servers first). `vet-skills try mapbox` runs it now and prints the full answer.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 82/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/faketime

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/index.ts:39 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst envPath = join(process.cwd(), '.env');Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Tunneling service URLscripts/dev-http-server.ts:23 · Tunneling service URL — may route traffic to attacker infrastructure* # then add https://<ngrok-id>.ngrok.app/mcp as a ChatGPT developer-modeFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/index.ts:4 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// Load environment variables from .env file if presentFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/index.ts:37 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// Load .env from current working directory (where npm run is executed)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspackage.json:31 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"tracing:verify": "node -e \"console.log('🔍 Verifying tracing setup with Jaeger...\\n1. Copy .env.example to .env and add your MAPBOX_ACCESS_TOKEN\\n2. Start Jaeger: npm run tracing:jaeger:start\\n3.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagepackage.json:20 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code"dev:http": "npx -y tsx scripts/dev-http-server.ts",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/index.ts:45 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// Read and parse .env file using Node.js built-in parseEnvFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/index.ts:233 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// Record .env loading as a span (retrospectively since it happened before tracing init)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagepackage.json:19 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code"inspect:dev": "npx @modelcontextprotocol/inspector -e MAPBOX_ACCESS_TOKEN=\"$MAPBOX_ACCESS_TOKEN\" npx -y tsx src/index.ts",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈32 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.