Skills/Docker MCP Catalog/linkedin-mcp-server

linkedin-mcp-server@4.30.0

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "This MCP server allows Claude and other AI assistants to access your LinkedIn. Scrape LinkedIn profiles and companies, get your recommended jobs, and perform job searches. Set your li_at LinkedIn cookie to use this server." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry Docker MCP CatalogPublisher stickerdaniel · publishing for 286 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 19 h ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso linkedin.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- docker run -i --rm mcp/linkedin-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 69/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions; Destructive file system command detected; Credential pass-through configuration. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:278 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary>Session issues</summary> - Browser profile is stored at `~/.linkedin-mcp/profile/` - Managed browser downloads are cached at `~/.linkedin-mcp/patchrighFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Destructive file system command detected.agents/skills/3-verify-pr-fix/SKILL.md:88 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -f /tmp/verify-pr-$PR.json /tmp/verify-pr-$PR-headers /tmp/verify-pr-$PR.log /tmp/verify-pr-$PR-init.json /tmp/verify-pr-$PR-initialized.jsonFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationAGENTS.md:276 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialstreats every converted secret as required. The three optional proxy credentialsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
HIGH
Destructive file system command detected.agents/skills/2-repro-issue/SKILL.md:124 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -f /tmp/repro-$NUM-headers /tmp/repro-$NUM.log /tmp/repro-$NUM.port /tmp/repro-$NUM.pid /tmp/repro-$NUM-init.json /tmp/repro-$NUM-initialized.jsonFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:306 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary>Told to run <code>--login</code> on the host when you already did</summary> - If tool calls answer "No valid LinkedIn session is available in Docker" oFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:386 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary>Told to run <code>--login</code> on the host when you already did</summary> - If tool calls answer "No valid LinkedIn session is available in Docker" oFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Process kill command.agents/skills/3-verify-pr-fix/SKILL.md:85 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill $SERVER_PID 2>/dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:47 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschown -R pwuser:pwuser /opt/patchright && \Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/daemon_pilot.py:475 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# Never os.kill there: any signal but the console ones terminates.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)AGENTS.md:189 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkuv run -m linkedin_mcp_server --transport streamable-http --log-level DEBUGFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_bootstrap.py:5653 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking"https://ci-bot:s3cr3t@[email protected]/x.zip",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill command.agents/skills/2-repro-issue/SKILL.md:122 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill $SERVER_PID 2>/dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/docker-entrypoint.sh:132 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill -TERM "$xvfb_pid" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_bootstrap.py:8447 · Python subprocess execution detectedcompleted = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/daemon_pilot.py:388 · Python subprocess execution detectedchild = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP).agents/skills/3-verify-pr-fix/SKILL.md:99 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkuv run -m linkedin_mcp_server --transport streamable-http --port $PORT --log-level INFO > /tmp/verify-pr-$PR.log 2>&1 &Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsdocker-compose.yml:9 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# .env file. For a relay on the host use host.docker.internal, notFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill command.agents/skills/3-verify-pr-fix/SKILL.md:116 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes[ -z "$SESSION_ID" ] && { echo "MCP initialize returned no Mcp-Session-Id. Tail of /tmp/verify-pr-$PR.log:" >&2; tail -20 /tmp/verify-pr-$PR.log >&2; kill $SERVER_PID 2>/dev/null; exit 1; }Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_bootstrap.py:7170 · Python subprocess execution detectedrun = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-c", script], capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill command.agents/skills/3-verify-pr-fix/SKILL.md:104 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill -0 $SERVER_PID 2>/dev/null || { echo "Server died during startup. Tail of /tmp/verify-pr-$PR.log:" >&2; tail -20 /tmp/verify-pr-$PR.log >&2; exit 1; }Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/docker-entrypoint.sh:125 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill -TERM "$server_pid" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/catalog_stub.py:57 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileswhatever ``.env`` the checkout holds. The whole environment is restoredFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill command.agents/skills/2-repro-issue/SKILL.md:71 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill -0 $SERVER_PID 2>/dev/null || { echo "Server died during startup. Tail of /tmp/repro-$NUM.log:" >&2; tail -20 /tmp/repro-$NUM.log >&2; exit 1; }Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:378 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary>Use your own Chrome</summary> - Set **Chrome executable** in the extension's settings to a Chrome, Chromium or Chrome for Testing binary, such as `/usrFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/catalog_stub.py:54 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""No gate variable set, and the ``.env`` lookup finding *dotenv_path*.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill command.agents/skills/2-repro-issue/SKILL.md:86 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes[ -z "$SESSION_ID" ] && { echo "MCP initialize returned no Mcp-Session-Id. Tail of /tmp/repro-$NUM.log:" >&2; tail -20 /tmp/repro-$NUM.log >&2; kill $SERVER_PID 2>/dev/null; exit 1; }Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/conftest.py:116 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files``.env`` is part of the environment too. A developer running a real proxyFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/daemon_pilot.py:405 · Python subprocess execution detectedchild = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill command.agents/skills/2-repro-issue/SKILL.md:87 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesgrep -q '"error"' /tmp/repro-$NUM-init.json && { echo "Initialize returned a protocol error. Execution limit." >&2; cat /tmp/repro-$NUM-init.json >&2; kill $SERVER_PID 2>/dev/null; exit 1; }Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentials.github/mcp/server.json:75 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking…e://host:port (http, https, socks4 or socks5). May also include credentials, as http://user:password@host:port. Only browser traffic is routed.", "isSecret": true …Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_bootstrap.py:3754 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingb"sitecustomize: https://user:[email protected]/x?token=secret\x1b[2J\n"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP).github/CONTRIBUTING.md:3 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network…ues first, then use the [issue forms](https://github.com/stickerdaniel/linkedin-mcp-server/issues/new/choose) for anything new. AI agents follow the [issue-packet skill](https://github.com/stickerdaniel/linkedin-mcp-server/blob/main/.agent…Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
Process kill command.agents/skills/3-verify-pr-fix/SKILL.md:117 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesgrep -q '"error"' /tmp/verify-pr-$PR-init.json && { echo "Initialize returned a protocol error. Execution limit." >&2; cat /tmp/verify-pr-$PR-init.json >&2; kill $SERVER_PID 2>/dev/null; exit 1; }Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:48 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod -R 755 /opt/patchright && \Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_bootstrap.py:5647 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking"https://ci-bot:[email protected]/x.zip",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill command.agents/skills/2-repro-issue/SKILL.md:95 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes…rotocol error. Execution limit." >&2; cat /tmp/repro-$NUM-initialized.json >&2; kill $SERVER_PID 2>/dev/null; exit 1; } ``` Capture and inspect both response bodies…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentials.github/mcp/server.json:31 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking…e://host:port (http, https, socks4 or socks5). May also include credentials, as http://user:password@host:port. Only browser traffic is routed.", "isSecret": true …Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP).agents/skills/2-repro-issue/SKILL.md:65 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkuv run -m linkedin_mcp_server --transport streamable-http --port $PORT --log-level INFO > /tmp/repro-$NUM.log 2>&1 &Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_bootstrap.py:4911 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingurl = "https://ci-bot:[email protected]/chromium.zip"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/docker-entrypoint.sh:41 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesif ! kill -0 "$xvfb_pid" 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_bootstrap.py:3833 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking"sitecustomize: https://ci-bot:[email protected]/p?key=s3cr3t working\n"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP).vscode/tasks.json:89 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network"label": "uv run -m linkedin_mcp_server --no-headless --transport streamable-http",Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
Process kill command.agents/skills/3-verify-pr-fix/SKILL.md:125 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes…ocol error. Execution limit." >&2; cat /tmp/verify-pr-$PR-initialized.json >&2; kill $SERVER_PID 2>/dev/null; exit 1; } ``` Capture and inspect both response bodies…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:359 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary>Login issues</summary> - Make sure you have only one active LinkedIn session at a time - LinkedIn may require a login confirmation in the LinkedIn mobiFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/docker-entrypoint.sh:51 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill -TERM "$xvfb_pid" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP).github/mcp/server.json:13 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network"src": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/stickerdaniel/linkedin-mcp-server/main/assets/icons/icon.png",Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/docker-entrypoint.sh:148 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill -TERM "$server_pid" 2>/dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:49 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:287 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary>Login issues</summary> - Make sure you have only one active LinkedIn session at a time - LinkedIn may require a login confirmation in the LinkedIn mobiFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/run_uv_audit.py:146 · Python subprocess execution detectedcompleted = subprocess.run(command, capture_output=True, check=False, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/ci_changes.py:95 · Python subprocess execution detectedcompleted = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialsmanifest.json:163 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking…e://host:port (http, https, socks4 or socks5). May also include credentials, as http://user:password@host:port. Only browser traffic is routed.", "required": false, "def…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_pr_title.py:343 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_server.py:426 · Python subprocess execution detectedanswered = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_server.py:548 · Python subprocess execution detectedanswered = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_server.py:391 · Python subprocess execution detectedpulled_in_the_server_graph = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_config.py:1048 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking"proxy_server": "http://u:p@host:8080",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_ci_scope.py:89 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Hidden zero-width characters detectedtests/test_pr_title.py:180 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal content"fix: ​",Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_pr_title.py:426 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Hidden zero-width characters detectedtests/test_pr_title.py:169 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal content"fix(​): Subject",Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
MEDIUM
Bidirectional text override characters detectedtests/test_pr_title.py:154 · Bidirectional text override characters detected — may hide content direction"⁦",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/test_ci_scope.py:133 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network"plugins/linkedin-mcp-server/assets/icon.svg",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST04
MEDIUM
Hidden zero-width characters detectedtests/test_pr_title.py:168 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal content"fix: ​",Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_config.py:1024 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingconfig = BrowserConfig(proxy_server="http://user:p%40ss@gate:7000")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Bidirectional text override characters detectedtests/test_pr_title.py:152 · Bidirectional text override characters detected — may hide content direction"‪",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_tools.py:485 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingshaped = ToolError("Proxy refused http://acctzone9:[email protected]:7000")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
LOW
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentscripts/login-viewer.html:2 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent · informational: not an instruction fileThe Docker login viewer's page, served by websockify from /usr/share/novnc next to Debian's noVNC, whose documented RFB API it uses. login_viewer.py prints its Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Hidden zero-width characters detectedtests/test_pr_title.py:157 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal content"",Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
MEDIUM
Hidden zero-width characters detectedtests/test_pr_title.py:170 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal content"fix: Subject.​",Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_config.py:1014 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingconfig = BrowserConfig(proxy_server=f"http://user:{self.SECRET}@gate:7000")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_ci_scope.py:59 · Python subprocess execution detectedcompleted = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Bidirectional text override characters detectedtests/test_pr_title.py:155 · Bidirectional text override characters detected — may hide content direction"⁩",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Bidirectional text override characters detectedtests/test_pr_title.py:153 · Bidirectional text override characters detected — may hide content direction"‮",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_config.py:1155 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingAppConfig(), ["--proxy-server", f"http://u:{self.SECRET}@h:8080"]Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_setup.py:454 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/test_cli_main.py:1366 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network"linkedin_mcp_server.daemon.owner.direct_http_client",Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_config.py:1113 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingmonkeypatch.setenv("PROXY_SERVER", f"http://envuser:{self.SECRET}@gate:7000")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_throttle.py:326 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingRuntimeError(f"failed via http://{user}:{secret}@gate.example:7000"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Credential pass-through configurationtests/test_config.py:1295 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials"""A username with an empty password is a legitimate proxy credential.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈16,677 tok
8 files · 80 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

11 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim stickerdaniel: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  3. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
Publish a new version to Docker MCP Catalog, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim stickerdanielPropose a patch to the maintainer