Skills/Docker MCP Catalog/kubernetes

kubernetes@4.2.3

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Connect to a Kubernetes cluster and manage it" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry Docker MCP CatalogPublisher flux159 · publishing for 704 daysInstalls 469KLast detonated 16 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
K8S_TOKENMASK_SECRETSMCP_AUTH_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: ALLOW_KUBECTL_UNSAFE_FLAGS, ALLOW_ONLY_NON_DESTRUCTIVE_TOOLS, ALLOW_ONLY_READONLY_TOOLS, ALLOWED_TOOLS, DNS_REBINDING_ALLOWED_HOST, DNS_REBINDING_PROTECTION, ENABLE_TELEMETRY, ENABLE_UNSAFE_SSE_TRANSPORT, ENABLE_UNSAFE_STREAMABLE_HTTP_TRANSPORT, K8S_CA_DATA, K8S_CONTEXT, K8S_NAMESPACE, K8S_SERVER, K8S_SKIP_TLS_VERIFY, KUBECONFIG, KUBECONFIG_JSON, KUBECONFIG_PATH, KUBECONFIG_YAML, OTEL_CAPTURE_RESPONSE_METADATA, OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT, OTEL_RESOURCE_ATTRIBUTES, OTEL_SERVICE_NAME, OTEL_SERVICE_VERSION, OTEL_TRACES_SAMPLER, OTEL_TRACES_SAMPLER_ARG, SPAWN_MAX_BUFFER
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for K8S_TOKEN, MASK_SECRETS, MCP_AUTH_TOKEN and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- docker run -i --rm mcp/kubernetes

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 72/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; References a credential file in the home directory; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/security/kubectl-flags.ts:143 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// alongside the split one ("-f", "/etc/passwd").Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directoryCLAUDE.md:77 · References a credential file in the home directory- Server loads kubeconfig from multiple sources: KUBECONFIG_YAML env var, KUBECONFIG path, or ~/.kube/configFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:77 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- Server loads kubeconfig from multiple sources: KUBECONFIG_YAML env var, KUBECONFIG path, or ~/.kube/configFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmanifest.json:7 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files…ernetes cluster and manage it.\n\nBy default, the server loads kubeconfig from `~/.kube/config`.\n\nThe server will automatically connect to your current kubectl conte…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/security/kubectl-flags.ts:169 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// `format` is the full -o value, e.g. "templatefile=/etc/passwd" or justFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsserver.json:35 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"description": "Path to the kubeconfig file. Defaults to ~/.kube/config.",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directorymanifest.json:7 · References a credential file in the home directory…ernetes cluster and manage it.\n\nBy default, the server loads kubeconfig from `~/.kube/config`.\n\nThe server will automatically connect to your current kubectl context. Mak…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/security/kubectl-flags.ts:142 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// attached ("-f/etc/passwd") and clustered ("-Rf/etc/passwd") forms are caughtFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/security/kubectl-flags.ts:392 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files* reachable as a raw "--from-file=leak=/etc/passwd" token. Under stdio that isFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directoryserver.json:35 · References a credential file in the home directory"description": "Path to the kubeconfig file. Defaults to ~/.kube/config.",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandpackage.json:19 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"build": "tsc && shx chmod +x dist/*.js",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/tools/kubectl-create.ts:290 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// fromFileContent key of "x=/etc/passwd,y" would add a second source thatFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/tools/kubectl-patch.ts:134 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filestempFile = writeTempFile("patch.json", JSON.stringify(input.patchData));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/cronjob.test.ts:297 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log("Describe CronJob output excerpt:", describeOutput.substring(0, 300));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionCLAUDE.md:96 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…run version:update`, updates the version in every version-bearing file (`package.json`, `src/config/server-config.ts`, `manifest.json`, `CITATION.cff`, `README.md`, `gemini-extension.json`, and the Helm chart), commits `Bump version to <x.…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagepackage.json:26 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code"chat": "npx mcp-chat --server \"./dist/index.js\"",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:33 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsRUN useradd -m appuser && chown -R appuser /usr/local/appFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedsrc/tools/kubectl-create.ts:45 · Destructive file system command detected// which an enum cannot express. kubectlCreate checks the formatFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:10 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsRUN chmod 644 /etc/apt/keyrings/kubernetes-apt-keyring.gpgFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:20 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsRUN chmod 700 get_helm.shFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:12 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsRUN chmod 644 /etc/apt/sources.list.d/kubernetes.listFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,771 tok
3 files · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

8 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim flux159: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  6. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
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